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The idea of economic planning and state ownership of the means of 
production, which had been central to socialist economic thought for a century and 
a half, suddenly fell out of favor even among socialists after the fall of the Soviet 
Union. The three essays of this dissertation are in essence critiques of this 21st 
century orthodoxy. 
The first essay addresses the idea of market socialism, as proposed by 
several academic works in the decades before and after the fall of the USSR. The 
essay questions whether market socialism would be substantially different from 
capitalism in practice. It aims to show that any economic system which is based 
 
v  
on market relations and atomized ownership of the means of production would 
feature a type of exploitation very similar to that found under capitalism, meaning 
that such a system would not be substantially different from a capitalist society 
with a welfare state. 
The second essay is a study of a problem that may be faced by all planned 
economies. Historically, planned economies faced pressure to maintain old 
industries, old workplaces and old jobs, so as not to cause social disruption. There 
is a tradeoff between technological progress and job stability. This creates a 
dilemma: Can socialism keep pace with capitalist innovation while providing full 
job security? The essay explores this question and answers in the affirmative, with 
some qualifications. 
The third essay aims to challenge the notion that socialist economic 
planning "failed" in the Soviet Union and East-Central Europe. It is an empirical 
study of the economic performance of the Soviet-type socialist economies under 
the stagnation conditions of their worst-performing decade, compared with the 
experiences of the same countries after the transition to capitalism. The findings 
suggest that although a few countries saw a net benefit from the transition to 
capitalism, the majority saw a net loss. The region as a whole also saw a net loss, 
and its current economic trajectory makes it unlikely that this loss would be offset 
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 From the industrial revolution until quite recently, ideas proposing to radically 
transform society for the better were a central element of the global political landscape. 
Whether in the form of intellectual utopias or militant revolutionary movements, they 
have shaped our modern world in innumerable ways. And without a doubt, the most 
influential among them has been the idea of socialism. From its beginnings among social 
reformers and thinkers of the early 19th century, through its transformation into an 
international working class movement in the second half of that century, socialism came 
to dominate the politics, history and economics of the 20th century as a result of the 
Russian Revolution, the creation of the Soviet Union, and the post-1945 growth of an 
entire world system of socialist states. Whether one supported "actually existing 
socialism", or envisioned some different type of socialism, or opposed all types of it 
altogether, there could be no denying that the socialist idea (and by extension the broader 
concept of a radical restructuring of the economy and society) held center stage for the 
bulk of the 20th century. 
  But then, suddenly, it was gone. The defeat suffered by the Soviet Union and its 
allies at the end of the Cold War in 1989-91 marked far more than a shift in the geopolitical 
balance of power. It also deeply affected the intellectual landscape. Socialism - in all its 
many different versions and forms - found itself discredited. Although the Soviet system 
only represented one particular type of socialism, it had come to represent socialism-in-
general in the popular imagination. The advocates of liberal capitalism declared - 
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somewhat prematurely - that the end of history was at hand. Socialist parties and 
organizations of many different orientations suffered extreme demoralization. Some 
political parties, such as the Italian Communist Party, even voted to dissolve themselves. 
But throughout all this, there were very few attempts to evaluate the legacy of the Soviet 
system and to determine precisely what had gone wrong. It was simply taken for granted 
that "socialism", in some grand sense, had failed, and that constructing a better socialist 
society would be either impossible or would require borrowing heavily from certain aspects 
of capitalist society (especially markets). 
 In the early stages of the Cold War, especially during the 1950s, the dominant 
Western view of the Soviet economy (and, by extension, any socialist planned economy in 
general) was that it achieved fast economic growth but was undesirable because it restricted 
individual freedom. By the time the Cold War ended, this view had radically shifted, and 
planned economies were seen as inherently prone to waste and inefficiency, and unable to 
produce adequate economic growth. The collapse of the Soviet socialist world system was 
taken as proof that the latter view was correct, although very little effort was made to 
investigate whether the actual causes of the collapse of the Soviet socialist system were in 
fact related to any inherent flaw of socialism (as opposed to simply being the result of 
historically contingent events). It was simply asserted, and believed, that because the 
socialist world system had collapsed, that meant that a socialist planned economy was 
inherently flawed and economically inferior. As a result, many former advocates of 
socialism abandoned it altogether and came to embrace various forms of social democratic 
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capitalism. Others sought to combine a commitment to a radical restructuring of economic 
life with a belief in the superiority of markets, and became proponents of various forms of 
market socialism. The idea of economic planning and state ownership of the means of 
production, which had been central to socialist economic thought for a century and a half, 
suddenly fell out of favor even among socialists. 
 The three essays which follow are in essence critiques of this new orthodoxy. The 
topic of the first essay is market socialism, with a focus on the most prominent market 
socialist proposals that have been made in recent decades. Rather than launching into a 
discussion of the feasibility or possible economic performance of the various market 
socialist proposals, the essay instead asks whether market socialism is substantially 
different from capitalism in the first place. It aims to show that, in any economic system 
which is based on market relations and atomized ownership of the means of production, 
there will be de facto capitalist exploitation. Thus, apart from any negative economic 
outcomes that it may produce, market socialism is undesirable in principle, because it is not 
substantially different from capitalism - and if our goal is merely to achieve better 
outcomes within capitalism, there are far less costly ways of doing this than trying to 
redesign the economy. 
 The second essay identifies a dilemma that may be present in all models of 
socialism which feature a planned economy (democratic or not). While critiques of 
economic planning are often couched in the language of "efficiency", the main difficulty 
actually faced by historical planned economies in their competition with capitalism was the 
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fact that they could not keep pace with capitalist technological change after a certain point 
in their history. The centralized, top-down Soviet model of economic planning gave 
enterprise managers incentives to be technologically conservative and to avoid taking the 
risks associated with innovation. However, decision makers in a democratically planned 
economy may well face similar incentives, because innovation disrupts the lives of workers 
by rendering old jobs obsolete, so there is likely to be democratic pressure on workplaces 
to act in a technologically conservative manner. In general, there is a natural tradeoff 
between job stability and innovation, which places all types of socialism in a dilemma as 
long as they must compete with rival capitalist societies. Capitalism pursues innovation 
without regard for its effects on jobs and workers. How can socialism keep up the same rate 
of innovation without sacrificing job stability? The essay provides a few potential 
solutions. 
 The third essay aims to challenge the notion that socialist economic planning 
"failed" in the Soviet Union and East-Central Europe. It is an empirical study of the 
economic performance of the Soviet-type socialist economies during their worst-
performing decade (the 1980s) compared with the experiences of the same countries after 
the transition to capitalism. The commonly held view is that Soviet-type economic 
planning was fundamentally inferior to capitalist market economies, and that the transition 
to capitalism in the former USSR and East-Central Europe brought net economic benefits 
in the end, in spite of high initial costs. However, what emerges from the data is that the 
high economic and social costs of transition were in many cases greater than the benefits. 
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The region as a whole suffered a major economic downturn coupled with increased 
inequality and unemployment, only to return to roughly the same growth path it was on 
before the transition. However, there is considerable variation between countries. Some 
economies performed better under socialism, others under capitalism, and there are even a 
few cases where the transition does not appear to have made a difference either way (at 
least in terms of GDP per capita).  Thus, overall, we may conclude that the historical 
economic performance of planned economies, in their most unfavorable decade, is not 
systematically inferior to the performance of comparable market economies. This provides 
a reason to be hopeful about the potential of future planned economies, operating on a 













EXPLOITATION UNDER MARKET SOCIALISM 
 
1.1  Introduction 
The idea of a happy marriage between socialist ideals and a market economy has 
existed for a long time. However, at least from the mid-19th century until recently, the 
majority of socialists were clearly advocates of economic planning of various kinds. 
Indeed, the link between socialism and a planned economy was so strong that the two terms 
were sometimes even considered synonymous. But in recent decades, with the fall of the 
Soviet-type economies and the ascendancy of neoliberalism, market socialist ideas have 
come to rival the ideas of socialist economic planning. As such, if we are to effectively 
evaluate proposals for a socialist alternative to capitalism, it is now more important than 
ever to study market socialist proposals with a critical eye and inquire whether they are 
useful visions for the organization of a future socialist society. It can no longer be taken for 
granted that critics of capitalism support an economic system based on economic planning. 
On the contrary, today we can almost take it for granted that even critics of capitalism are 
willing to concede the necessity of preserving some type of market economy. But is this 
concession necessary? Market socialist proposals have been debated and criticized from 
many different perspectives, with critics on the right generally arguing that the market 
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cannot bring its alleged benefits in a socialist economy, and critics on the left generally 
focusing on pervasive market failures, long-term instability, and the danger of a return to 
capitalism. But another type of criticism can also be made, drawing upon one of the 
original impulses that gave rise to the socialist project in the first place: the desire to create 
a society free of economic exploitation. This essay contends that market socialism - and 
indeed any type of economic system based upon market allocation of the factors of 
production - cannot be free of exploitation. It further argues that if one abandons the goal of 
building a society free of exploitation, then there is little reason to support any kind of 
socialism at all, as practically all of the positive aspects of market socialism could also be 
achieved by a capitalist system with a significant degree of redistribution and state 
regulation of market activity. 
1.2  Models of market socialism 
The forms of market socialism that we have chosen to discuss are those put forward 
by John Roemer (1994, 1996a), Alec Nove (1983), Włodzimierz Brus (1972) and Ota Šik 
(1967). There is a special focus on Roemer, as he is the market socialist author who most 
directly addresses the question of exploitation. Together, these proposals are representative 
of the kinds of economic models advocated by market socialists today. Notably absent is a 
discussion of Oskar Lange’s Walrasian idea of socialism. That model is often cited as the 
earliest proposal for “market socialism,” but this is a misnomer. Lange’s model is not a 
type of market-driven socialism, but a planned economy in which the planners deliberately 
set out to mimic perfectly competitive market outcomes by having firms set their prices 
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equal to marginal costs. It was meant as a rebuttal of Hayek’s contention that socialist 
planners would not be able to rationally determine prices. Not only can they rationally 
determine prices, argues Lange, but in fact they could even decide to mimic market prices 
if we were to concede that market prices are in some sense “correct”. However, the firms in 
Lange’s model do not attempt to make a profit and do not actually engage in competition. 
They simply follow two rules: 1) for any output, use the combination of inputs for which 
the ratio of marginal product to price of all inputs is equal; and 2) choose the output for 
which marginal cost equals price. Meanwhile, investment is allocated by the state. (Lange, 
Lippincott, and Taylor 1938) For these reasons, Lange’s model is very different from 
anything that would be called “market socialism” today. 
1.2.1  Nove’s “feasible socialism” 
Alec Nove, in The Economics of Feasible Socialism (1983), proposes a model of 
market socialism that incorporates many ideas from other authors who have written on the 
subject (including Brus and Šik, discussed later in this essay). The result is an extremely 
flexible market socialist project, in the sense that Nove’s “feasible socialism” does not aim 
to decide in advance exactly how much the state will do and how much will be left to the 
market. Instead, the boundary between plan and market can be shifted by policy changes 
within the system at any time. There are five types of enterprises in Nove’s socialism, and 
each type employs a certain proportion of the workforce and uses a certain part of society’s 
capital assets. By expanding the domain of one enterprise type at the expense of another, 
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Nove’s model can approximate anything from near-Soviet-style planning to near-
capitalism. 
First, there are state-owned enterprises, integrated into a comprehensive national 
plan and controlled by a central planning agency. These form the planned sector of the 
economy, and Nove envisions this sector as consisting mainly of heavy industry, resource 
extraction, infrastructure, and other industries that exhibit great economies of scale and 
lend themselves quite well to bureaucratic planning. (Nove 1983: 201) Second, there are 
the so-called “socially owned” enterprises, which are firms owned by the state but 
controlled by their workers (or rather, controlled by managers elected by the workers). 
These can be contrasted with the third type of enterprises, which are fully worker-owned 
co-ops. Both types are controlled by their workers in their day-to-day operations. But in the 
socially owned enterprises the workers serve as agents of the state, and the state 
appropriates the profits and decides how they shall be used. In the co-ops, profits are 
appropriated by the employee-owners. (Nove 1983: 206) Nove argues that the socially 
owned and co-op sectors should cover the sectors of the economy that call for middle-sized 
enterprises. Finally, the last two categories consist of privately owned enterprises 
(essentially identical to capitalist firms) and self-employed individuals working 
independently. Nove believes that private ownership is most appropriate for small and very 
small enterprises, but he argues that if anyone is able to set up a small business and operate 
it profitably, he should be allowed to do so. The only rule is that private owners must also 
be workers in their own firms. Nove claims that this is enough to ensure the absence of 
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exploitation, as the owners’ income would be derived from labor and not property. (Nove 
1983: 207) All of the various types of enterprises would sell their products on the market. 
All of them except the state-owned enterprises would also buy all their inputs on the market 
and use profit maximization as their goal. However, major investments would always be 
consciously planned by a central authority. 
There are other important features of Nove’s model, and he goes into considerable 
detail, but the essential aspects have been outlined above. What Nove proposes is an 
economic system where all possible types of enterprises (including capitalist ones) may co-
exist, subject to a few simple limitations to ensure that the state-owned and employee-
owned sectors remain dominant. As noted before, Nove’s proposal is in principle 
compatible with an economy that is dominated by the state-owned and planned sector, 
since he does not put a strict limit on how much of the economy can be covered by 
enterprises of the first type. But that is clearly not the spirit of his proposal. He clearly 
imagines most economic activity being performed by the “socially owned” and employee 
owned sectors. 
1.2.2  Brus and Šik, the socialist market reformers 
Włodzimierz Brus and Ota Šik were prominent market socialist authors writing in 
Eastern Europe during the Cold War. Unlike Nove and Roemer, their project was not to 
invent a blueprint for market socialism from scratch, but rather to advocate market-oriented 
reforms within the framework of the Soviet-type economies in their home countries 
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(Poland and Czechoslovakia). Thus, the proposals of Brus and Šik are much more concrete 
and policy-oriented, dealing with issues that were important at the time of writing instead 
of timeless abstractions. On the other hand, for the same reasons, Brus and Šik do not go 
into much detail about how precisely their ideal society would be organized. It is often hard 
to tell the difference between what they consider to be objectively best and what they 
consider to be the most realistic option that could be pursued at the time. 
Brus envisions an economic system that combines a Soviet-type central planning 
agency with extensive autonomy and profit-maximizing behavior for individual firms. The 
central planning agency would have fewer functions than in the Soviet model. It would be 
responsible for creating national economic plans, but these plans would be less detailed 
than in the Soviet model, and in particular they would refrain from specifying output 
quantities for most goods. They would instead focus on such aggregates as the 
macroeconomic rate of growth, the proportion of national income that should be dedicated 
to investment, and the precise nature of this investment. Brus emphasizes that the central 
planning agency, not individual firms, would make most investment decisions and control 
foreign trade. That agency would also determine “the basic outline of the earnings structure 
for wage and salary earners,” and issue directives for the production of specific quantities 
of goods in a few special cases. (Brus 1972: 139) 
Meanwhile, all other economic decisions would be left to the managers of 
individual firms. Most importantly, prices would not be set by the central plan like in the 
Soviet model. Instead, each firm would be free to determine the price of its outputs and to 
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negotiate contracts with its suppliers. There would also be some firm autonomy in setting 
wages, although Brus does not specify how much. A firm would be able to use some part of 
its profits for investment, if it so desires, separate from the central investment fund 
allocated by the planning authority. However, individuals may not set up new firms (only 
the planning agency may do that), and one firm may not invest in another. Naturally, firm 
managers would also have the power to decide on the internal organization and production 
processes of their enterprises. The guiding principle of all firm activity would be profit 
maximization. (Brus 1972: 140-141) 
Šik’s vision of market socialism is largely similar to that of Brus, but with some 
important differences. Like Brus, Šik takes the traditional Soviet model as his starting point 
and advocates incremental reforms. Thus, Šik’s model also includes a central planning 
agency. However, he supports a greater role for the market than Brus. Šik proposes that all 
firms, even the larger ones, should operate according to market principles and have the 
ability to set their own prices and make purchases as they see fit. At the same time, the 
capital assets of the large firms (and some part of the capital assets of the mid-sized firms) 
would be the property of a publicly owned fund. The remainder of the capital assets of mid-
sized firms would be owned privately by their employees. Small firms would be worker co-
ops, and some particularly tiny ones may even be privately owned by individuals. The main 
roles of the central planning agency would be to control investment and foreign trade, and 
also to decide how firm profits are to be used (what proportion is to be used by the 
owners—state or private—as they see fit, what proportion to be used for investment, and 
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what proportion to be used for social consumption). One peculiar feature of Šik’s model is 
that firms would be mandated to engage in “profit optimization” rather than profit 
maximization. What Šik appears to mean by this phrase is that the central planning agency 
may set goals that firms are required to meet, for example social goals such as requiring a 
construction company to build a certain type of houses. 
1.2.3  Roemer’s market socialism  
 John Roemer's concept of market socialism, as laid out in A Future for Socialism, 
Egalitarian Perspectives and elsewhere, has been perhaps the most influential market 
socialist vision in the post-Cold War world. It is a vision that Roemer describes and 
defends in great detail, while also admitting that it is an economic model quite close to 
capitalism, sharing most of the features of a capitalist market economy. Production would 
be carried out by independent, profit-maximizing firms structured in much the same way as 
capitalist firms. There would be a labor market, and wages would be determined by that 
market. Furthermore, although Roemer does allow for the existence of a public sector, 
“almost all private goods and services will be allocated on markets, and prices will be 
determined in these markets.” (Roemer 1996a: 291) 
In the end, as Roemer himself points out, his proposal for market socialism only 
differs from capitalism in two respects. First, he envisions government control of 
investment through the setting of different interest rates for different industries or sectors. 
These interest rates would be controlled by the state bank or banks, although private banks 
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would also be permitted to exist (at least as part of industrial groups similar to the Japanese 
keiretsu). Second, Roemer’s model features public ownership of firms, so that the part of 
firm profits that is currently used for the luxury consumption of the capitalists would 
instead be redistributed to the workers as a social dividend. Roemer argues that the social 
dividend should be equally distributed to all people, so as to realize the egalitarian 
aspirations of socialism. But he admits that non-egalitarian distributions are also possible. 
(Roemer 1996a: 292) Since the people are technically the collective owners of all firms in 
this economy, managers are responsible to them. But in Roemer's view, this responsibility 
consists of little more than making profit-maximizing decisions. As long as the managers 
are each striving to maximize profit, they are doing their duty to the people, and no direct 
control over them is necessary. Thus, public ownership does not mean public control or 
workers’ democracy. 
In this model, citizens would receive income from three sources: wages, interest 
from savings, and the aforementioned social dividend. Since wages would be set by the 
market in the same way as under capitalism, and since savings would also be accumulated 
in the same way, Roemer himself admits that “substantial inequality will continue to exist 
in this society.” But he also claims that the final income distribution will be “far more equal 
than in most, if not all, capitalist societies,” due to the equal social dividend that all people 
get from corporate profits. (Roemer 1996a: 293) This type of market socialism would 
therefore be more egalitarian than capitalism, but probably not much more egalitarian. 
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Roemer devotes considerable space to discussing the issue of investment and 
managerial discipline under market socialism, to answer the objection that a stock market 
(and therefore private ownership) would be needed to ensure efficient management of firms 
by creating a group of shareholders who have a direct financial interest in firing 
incompetent managers. He points to the example of post-war Japanese capitalism and its 
keiretsu, as a model of a market economy where investment is not usually directed by a 
stock market and managers are not routinely hired and fired by boards representing 
shareholders, and yet firms are managed efficiently. (Roemer 1996a: 295) This argument 
may be intended to assuage the concerns of capitalist critics of his model, who would 
object to any deviation from contemporary capitalism, no matter how minor. 
1.3  The idea of exploitation and the purpose of socialism 
 After surveying recent proposals for market socialism, we must now take a step 
back and ask a fundamental question: What is, after all, the purpose of socialism? The 
market socialist authors are concerned with defending socialism—or a certain version of 
socialism—against the criticism that it would be inefficient, insufficiently innovative, or 
otherwise inferior to market-driven capitalism. They do this by proposing models of 
socialism that would incorporate the main virtues of capitalism. But if we are to reinvent 
socialism by incorporating capitalist elements, the question arises: Why advocate an 
economic system that is different from capitalism in the first place? What do socialists 
hope to achieve through socialism? 
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1.3.1  The meaning and purpose of socialism 
It is difficult to pinpoint the precise historical origins of the concept of socialism, 
but in its modern form it is generally understood to have begun with the early 19th century 
social reformers that were retroactively named "utopian socialists". Thinkers such as Henri 
de Saint-Simon, Robert Owen and Charles Fourier envisioned various types of ideal 
societies, generally characterized by equality, solidarity, non-violence, and a lack of social 
conflict. Later, with the development of Marxism, the concept of socialism came to be 
associated with the idea of a victorious class struggle waged by the proletariat against the 
bourgeoisie. In the Marxian sense of the word, socialism is a type of society that arises out 
of the contradictions of capitalism and that abolishes private property over the means of 
production and class exploitation. This class-based vision was so successful that, by the 
early 20th century, the word "socialism" was associated almost exclusively with the idea of 
a militant working class movement seeking to overthrow the bourgeoisie. In the wake of 
the First World War, this movement split in two opposing camps: social democracy and 
Marxism-Leninism. At first, they both continued to regard socialism primarily in terms of 
class struggle, although they differed over the question of which tactics and strategies were 
appropriate in carrying out this struggle. But over time, social democracy—which 
advocated the strategy of gradual reforms within a liberal democratic framework—
abandoned the ideas of class struggle, of removing the bourgeoisie from power, and of 
replacing capitalism with a fundamentally different economic system. By the 21st century, 
social democracy came to be identified with support for the welfare state, redistributive 
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economic policies, free provision of social services, and a general attempt to make 
capitalism more egalitarian without changing the ownership of the means of production. 
Meanwhile, the various schools of thought inspired by orthodox Marxism or Marxism-
Leninism continue to advocate the replacement of capitalism with a different economic 
system. They do not agree on the features of this system but they all tend to call it 
"socialism". 
It would be futile to attempt to determine which of the many different visions of 
socialism constitutes "true" socialism. However, there is a clear division between those 
self-described socialists who see "socialism" as a complete economic system that would 
replace capitalism, and those self-described socialists who think only in terms of policy 
improvements and not systemic change. For the purpose of this essay, the idea of an 
alternative economic system will be called "socialism" and the idea of policy improvements 
within a capitalist framework will be called "social democracy". Therefore, when we ask 
what is the purpose of socialism, we are asking what is the purpose of replacing capitalism 
with an alternative economic system. 
Historically, Marxism criticized capitalism for being an economic system based on 
class exploitation, in which the owners of the means of production (the capitalists, the 
bourgeoisie) extract surplus value from those who produce it (the working class, the 
proletariat). This concept of exploitation is both a fundamental element of the Marxian 
analysis of capitalism, and the chief moral reason why Marxists advocate socialism. In the 
Marxian view, the main purpose of socialism is to abolish the “exploitation of man by 
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man,” the state of affairs in which a ruling class obtains unearned income (in the form of 
profit, interest and rent) from the labor of an exploited class. But socialism is also supposed 
to accomplish other goals as well: to remove barriers to the further development of the 
forces of production (i.e. to ensure further technological progress), to provide for the basic 
material needs of all people in society, to guarantee a higher degree of economic and social 
equality than under capitalism, to eliminate unemployment and business cycles, and to 
remove imperialism and major wars from the world stage by eliminating the reasons for 
their existence. More recently, the idea of enabling human society to develop without 
destroying the Earth’s environment could also be widely considered as a goal of socialism. 
These goals are very ambitious, especially when considered together. Some of 
them, such as the abolition of exploitation in the Marxist sense or the end of business 
cycles, obviously cannot be achieved under capitalism. Others may be achieved under 
capitalism on their own (for example, technological progress), but not when combined with 
the others (for example, it is hard to imagine a capitalist society achieving technological 
progress while at the same time having abolished unemployment). A movement pursuing 
all of these goals must necessarily be socialist rather than social democratic. That is to say, 
it must seek to replace capitalism rather than reform it. 
On the other hand, if we have a movement pursuing only some of those goals and 
not others, that movement may not need to be socialist. Suppose, for example, that we were 
only concerned with the goal of providing for the basic material needs of all people in 
society: food, clean water, clothing, shelter, health care and education. Could this be 
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achieved under a system that is basically capitalist? Both history and an understanding of 
capitalism show that this is possible. A straightforward welfare state could accomplish this 
goal. It would be a more extensive welfare state than most of those currently in existence, 
but, other than requiring high taxes, it need not interfere with capitalism at all. If someone 
proposed replacing capitalism with another economic system for the sole purpose of 
providing for people’s basic needs, such a proposal would be rightly regarded as 
unnecessary. There is no need to take the radical step of replacing capitalism in order to 
achieve a goal that can be accomplished through social democratic policies. 
The same holds true for any other proposal with limited or modest goals. And the 
market socialists tend to have precisely such modest goals. John Roemer, for example, 
defines the goals of his version of socialism purely in terms of maximizing equality of 
opportunity in three major areas: self-realization and welfare, political influence, and social 
status. (Roemer 1994: 11) The second area—political influence—is explicitly identified 
with political democracy. The other areas have to do with economic equality, provision of 
basic necessities, and opportunities to engage in meaningful work. All of these can be 
provided by a social democratic state under capitalism. It is therefore not clear why Roemer 
believes it would be worthwhile to reorganize society along market socialist lines, when the 
goals of his market socialism could be just as easily achieved through a robust welfare 
state. 
The criticism of market socialism in this essay fundamentally hinges on this type of 
argument: If the goals or outcomes of a certain model of socialism are no different from 
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what can be achieved with a robust capitalist welfare state, then why bother with this kind 
of socialism at all? To restructure an entire society’s economic system is a complicated, 
risky, and very costly process. It can only be justified if the expected benefits are very great 
and cannot be obtained any other way. In other words, the pursuit of socialism can only be 
justified if socialism achieves some desirable goals that absolutely cannot be met under any 
kind of capitalism. Only ambitious socialism is worth pursuing. 
More specifically, we focus on the traditional socialist goal of abolishing 
exploitation, because this was historically the central promise of socialism and it is a goal 
that absolutely cannot be met under any kind of capitalism. We argue that abolition of 
exploitation also cannot be achieved under market socialism. 
1.3.2  The importance of exploitation 
Historically, the fundamental socialist criticism of capitalism is not that it is unequal 
or that it fails to provide a certain standard of living, but rather that it exploits the majority 
of people (the working class). This is the greatest Marxian contribution to the socialist 
tradition, and it is the central issue that separates socialists from liberal and progressive 
advocates of a reformed capitalism. The exploitation argument holds that capitalism is 
fundamentally and inevitably unjust. Thus, socialism is necessary because capitalism 
requires exploitation and exploitation is immoral. In addition, exploitation plays a major 
role in creating the conditions for many of the other negative features of capitalism, such as 
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the irrational accumulation drive, overwork and harsh working conditions, destruction of 
the environment, and imperial rivalries. 
Some of the other goals of socialism, listed in the preceding section, may not 
require the abolition of capitalism in order to be accomplished. It is primarily the issue of 
exploitation that motivates socialists to be anti-capitalists in principle. As such, it is telling 
that the market socialists do not usually consider exploitation to be a major concern (or, 
sometimes, any concern at all). John Roemer goes so far as to claim that socialists were 
wrong to focus on exploitation in the first place. He argues that to condemn capitalism for 
its exploitation is to say that people deserve what they produce (and no more or less than 
that), and then reasons that socialists cannot support such a view because socialists 
advocate extensive social assistance for many people who are not direct producers (the 
elderly, the sick, stay-at-home parents, and so on). (Roemer 1994: 16) 
This argument grossly misrepresents the traditional socialist position. It has never 
been the contention of any group of socialists that each individual should receive precisely 
the wealth that he or she produces, and that children or the elderly or other non-workers 
should therefore get nothing at all. It has always been understood that some form of direct 
or indirect “taxation” would have to occur, so that workers are compensated based on their 
labor but not at a 100% rate. A certain percentage of the wealth produced by society would 
go into a common pool, which would be used to support the welfare state, other collective 




A critic may ask: How, then, is this different from exploitation? The key difference 
is that under socialism the surplus is not appropriated by one class from another as is the 
case under capitalism. Rather, the surplus is appropriated by a public entity, not a minority 
class, with the amount of surplus and its uses decided by the population. A child or an 
elderly relative or a hospital patient do not exploit the workers who support them (and who 
decided precisely to what extent to support them). It is not the same thing to say that 
society should pay for cancer treatment, as to say that society should allow the existence of 
landowners who can charge rent. Exploitation is a situation where a powerful party extracts 
some form of wealth from a weaker party, not any situation where someone receives less 
wealth than he or she created. 
Roemer argues that socialism should be based on egalitarian theories of justice 
rather than on the desire to combat exploitation. (Roemer 1994: 17) And it is certainly true 
that the egalitarian impulse has been an important part of every historical socialist 
movement. You cannot have socialism without egalitarianism. But it is difficult to see how 
a convincing socialist argument could ever be based on egalitarianism alone. Scandinavian 
social democracies have been among the most egalitarian societies in recorded history, 
rivaling and even surpassing Soviet-type societies in terms of income equality (though not 
equality of wealth). Someone who is solely concerned with equality combined with a high 
standard of living should logically support the Scandinavian model of capitalism, rather 
than any proposal to replace capitalism with socialism. After all, social democracy appears 
to be just as egalitarian as socialism, and it is far easier to achieve. Roemer himself 
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acknowledges social democracy as being just as good as market socialism at achieving the 
limited goals he advocates, (Roemer 1994: 54) but believes that the Scandinavian model is 
contingent on special historical circumstances and would be difficult to reproduce 
elsewhere. This may be so, but market socialism requires a complete restructuring of 
capital ownership and large-scale expropriation in order to get started (at least 
expropriation of financial assets, if nothing else). However contingent Scandinavian social 
democracy may be, it is surely easier to achieve than getting the vast majority of 
shareholders in a capitalist society to give up their stock. 
Therefore, an argument for socialism (as opposed to social democracy) cannot rely 
on the egalitarian impulse alone. It must rely on a more fundamental critique of capitalism 
as necessarily unjust, such as the one associated with the concept of exploitation. Without a 
notion of exploitation and the desire to remove exploitation from society, it is hard to see 
how one could justify a radical change of economic system as opposed to mere adjustments 
of policy within capitalism. It is therefore important to see what the various market socialist 
authors have to say about exploitation. 
1.3.3  Views of exploitation among market socialists 
 Nove's treatment of exploitation is not persuasive. His claim that small business 
owners do not exploit their employees as long as they work alongside them is false, no 
matter what definition of exploitation we adopt. According to Marxist theory, small 
business owners derive some of their income from their own labor, but they also get some 
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income from exploitation. There is no rigorous theory of exploitation that would allow us 
to say that anyone who performs any labor is definitely not exploiting anyone else. Thus, 
Nove’s model certainly involves some degree of exploitation. But perhaps this is not so 
bad, as long as it remains a marginal phenomenon. After all, Nove might argue, we should 
not expect perfection. This is true, except that exploitation can also occur in the employee-
owned sector of the economy (see section 4.2). So, far from being a fringe phenomenon, 
exploitation may be a major feature of Nove’s proposed system. 
 The Brus-Šik model, being a reformed version of the Soviet system, shares some of 
its main features with regard to exploitation. The means of production are owned 
collectively by the whole people (at least nominally), and there is a central planning agency 
that controls investment and foreign trade, creates new enterprises, directly and fully plans 
the production of a few particularly important goods, and sets wages (or at least sets the 
upper and lower boundaries for firm-determined wages). So far, whether or not there is 
exploitation depends entirely on one’s opinion about exploitation in Soviet-type societies—
a debate that cannot be summarized here. But this is not the whole story. Most firms are 
controlled by managers with extensive autonomy. They decide how to use the firm’s profits 
(or net income), they set aside a fund for capital replacement, and they can influence the 
wage rates paid by the firm. In addition, of course, they control the labor process inside the 
firm. Thus, overall, these managers certainly have the potential to be exploitative. They 
could unofficially extract surplus value by raising their own salaries and lowering workers’ 
wages. Perhaps if the workers elected their own managers and if those managers made 
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decisions through collective and democratic means, we could say there was no exploitation. 
But even that is doubtful, as explained in section 4.2. 
 Unlike the other market socialist authors, John Roemer delved deeply into the 
question of exploitation, and provided his own rigorous definition of the concept. In 
Property Relations vs. Surplus Value in Marxian Exploitation (1982), Roemer presents his 
property relations approach to exploitation, which he claims to be superior to the classical 
Marxian surplus value approach (that relies on the labor theory of value). Roemer engages 
in this exercise of creating a new definition of exploitation largely in order to show that the 
concept does not have to rely on the labor theory of value, but for the purpose of this essay 
we will use his concept of exploitation to evaluate his proposal for market socialism. 
Roemer begins the presentation of his theory of exploitation with a brief critique of 
the traditional Marxist approach on this matter. He correctly identifies the traditional 
Marxist definition of exploitation as one based on the expropriation of surplus labor, and 
explains this definition as follows: “If A is an exploited agent, then another agent B is said 
to exploit A if the surplus labor performed by A is embodied in goods which B 
appropriates.” (Roemer 1982: 281) He then claims that property relations (specifically, 
private ownership of the means of production) are the cause of exploitation even in the 
traditional framework, and he states his intention to provide a theory of exploitation based 
solely on these property relations, without reference to the labor theory of value. It is 
apparent that Roemer’s creation of a new theory of exploitation stems from a desire to 
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show that capitalism is an exploitative system while accepting the neoclassical view of 
value. 
Very early on, Roemer explains that his view of exploitation is based on comparing 
the outcomes achieved by various groups of people in the present system with the 
outcomes they would achieve under some alternative arrangement. The alternative 
arrangement is taken as the standard or benchmark for non-exploitation.  Intuitively, to be 
exploited means to be put in a situation where you are worse off than you would be under 
the non-exploitative standard. (Roemer 1982: 285) Notice that this makes no reference to 
any theory of value or to any questions about production. While the traditional Marxist 
definition sees exploitation as a matter of taking something away from people who 
rightfully deserve to keep it (e.g. taking away surplus value from those who produce it), 
Roemer’s definition sees exploitation as a matter of wealth distribution. Formally, Roemer 
identifies a social group or “coalition” as being exploited if (a) they would be better off in 
an arrangement where they withdrew from society with a proportional share of society’s 
alienable property, (b) such an action would leave the other members of society worse off, 
and (c) those other members of society would be worse off even if the exploited coalition 
withdrew and took away only the property it currently owns. (Roemer 1982: 285) In other 
words, exploitation is what occurs when one group is worse off than it would be in a “fair” 
society, another group is better off than it would be in that fair society, and the latter 




Roemer claims that his definition of exploitation will sometimes lead to the same 
conclusions as the traditional definition, and when the two definitions lead to different 
conclusions then his definition yields the more intuitive result. He attempts to show this by 
constructing a series of hypothetical social arrangements and investigating whether 
exploitation occurs according to each of the two definitions. Most of his examples are 
based on a scenario of simple reproduction where only a single good is produced (corn), 
producers have a choice between farm technology and factory technology, and the latter is 
more efficient but requires the consumption of capital stock. (Roemer 1982: 287) There is 
not enough capital stock to allow all production to be carried out using the factory 
technology, and since we are dealing with simple reproduction there will never be enough 
capital stock for it. In these hypothetical scenarios, the capital stock (“seed corn”) 
represents the alienable property whose ownership is relevant for Roemer’s definition of 
exploitation. 
The first scenario is the basic non-exploitative standard. The capital stock is 
distributed equally to all members of society. Each person produces as much corn as 
possible in the factory and the rest on the farm. Exploitation clearly does not occur, by any 
definition. 
The second scenario is more intriguing. Capital stock is still distributed in a 
perfectly egalitarian fashion, but there is division of labor such that some members of 
society (the employers) use their capital to hire others to work for them. The employers 
extract a surplus from the workers they hire, and get the rest of the corn they need by 
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farming. The workers get exactly the same amount of corn as the employers, but they work 
exclusively in factories and therefore produce more than they get. Both groups perform the 
same amount of work, however. Roemer claims that this arrangement would be called 
exploitative under the traditional Marxist definition, since a surplus is being extracted, but 
argues that such a conclusion is nonsensical as long as all people do the same amount of 
work and get the same rewards. (Roemer 1982: 289) Under Roemer’s property relations 
definition, the arrangement is non-exploitative. 
The third scenario is essentially a capitalist arrangement, featuring a very small 
number of capitalists (who own all the capital stock), and the majority of the population 
divided between workers (employed in factories) and peasants (producing corn on their 
farms). Both definitions of exploitation agree that the workers are exploited and the 
peasants are not. However, the peasants form a reserve army whose existence may be 
necessary to reduce the bargaining power of the workers and thus ensure their continued 
exploitation. (Roemer 1982: 292)  Also, Roemer uses the situation of the peasants in this 
scenario to define something that he calls “unfair treatment,” which differs from 
exploitation in that one group is privileged and another is impoverished, but the withdrawal 
of the latter from society would not hurt the former. 
The fourth and fifth scenarios go together, and are meant to illustrate a point. In 
both scenarios there is a “rich island” and a “poor island.” Each island receives precisely 
the same payoff in both scenarios. But in the fourth scenario the two islands do not interact, 
while in the fifth scenario the rich islanders employ the poor islanders. Thus, under the 
29 
 
traditional Marxist definition, the poor islanders are exploited in the fifth scenario but not 
in the fourth. However, under Roemer’s definition, neither scenario is exploitative. 
(Roemer 1982: 294)  He uses this as an argument for the superiority of his definition, since 
he considers it intuitive that two scenarios yielding the same wealth distribution starting 
from the same initial conditions must both contain the same degree of exploitation (or lack 
thereof). 
The sixth scenario is similar to the third one (typical capitalism), but introduces an 
element of bargaining. The capitalists are still very privileged and hold all the capital stock, 
but the workers, for whatever reason, are strong enough to be able to bargain for a working 
day that is just slightly shorter than the working day they would face under the perfectly 
egalitarian scenario. This means they are not exploited according to Roemer’s definition, 
although they would be exploited under the traditional Marxist view. The peasants are the 
only group who fares worse in this scenario compared to perfect egalitarianism. Roemer 
uses this example to make a point about labor aristocracy. He claims that if the workers in 
advanced capitalist countries are in fact better off than they would be under a worldwide 
egalitarian distribution of property, then classical Marxism is mistaken to consider them 
exploited. (Roemer 1982: 295) 
Roemer presents other scenarios as well, but they are intended to illustrate the finer 
points of his theory by removing some of the simplifying assumptions, so they are not 
essential for the purpose of understanding his basic framework. 
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1.4  Is market socialism exploitative? 
 Having reviewed Roemer's theory of exploitation, we may now turn to the question 
of whether market socialism is exploitative. Naturally, this requires us to first define our 
terms. Which theory of exploitation are we employing, and which model of market 
socialism is being considered? We may begin with Roemer's model of market socialism. 
1.4.1  Exploitation under Roemer’s market socialism  
 As noted before, Roemer's market socialism is very similar to capitalism, with only 
two key differences: state control of investment and public ownership of the great majority 
of firms (although these would be privately managed and seek to maximize profits). It is 
the second difference that is relevant for the issue of exploitation. In the classical Marxian 
view, capitalism is exploitative because it contains a class of private owners of means of 
production who are able to extract surplus value from the working class and then realize 
this surplus value as profits, using those profits however they wish. Now, in Roemer's 
model, such a class is not supposed to exist. The means of production are the property of 
the people, held in trust by the state, and the profits that are not reinvested are given to the 
citizen-owners as a social dividend. 
 But appearances can be deceiving. Roemer's model of market socialism would still 
include company managers that are expected to act in precisely the same way as managers 
under capitalism—that is to say, they would seek to maximize profits—except that the state 
would seize all profits that are not re-invested, to distribute them as the social dividend. 
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The company managers would also have full control over hiring and firing and over wage 
policy, just as in capitalist firms. Given all this, the picture that emerges is of a system 
where the managers are de facto owners of companies, who simply have to pay a one 
hundred percent tax on non-reinvested profits. And since they have full control over wage 
policy, they would find it very easy to hide profits by inflating certain wages—their own, or 
those of their associates—thus leaving little or nothing to be taxed by the state. The fact 
that Roemer did not envision this outcome is most likely due to the fact that his theory does 
not take into account power relationships, and therefore ignores the enormous power that 
managers would have over companies if they are given a free hand to hire, fire, and set 
wages. 
 So Roemer's model of market socialism is in fact equivalent to capitalism with a 
peculiar tax structure, and would likely result in profits being hidden as inflated 
administrative wages. As such, it is easy to see that this economic system would still be 
exploitative in the classical Marxian sense, and furthermore it would specifically feature 
capitalist exploitation. Workers would sell their labor-power on a labor market, just as in 
capitalism. They would be paid wages according to the value of their labor-power, just as 
in capitalism. Surplus value would be appropriated by profit-maximizing companies that 
are privately owned in all but name, and some portion of this surplus value would be 
distributed to the de facto owners in the legal form of administrative wages. This is simply 
capitalism, beneath a very thin veil of legal fiction. 
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 Would it still be an exploitative system according to Roemer's own definition of 
exploitation, however? Let us recall that definition. A social coalition is being exploited if 
(a) they would be better off in an arrangement where they withdrew from society with a 
proportional share of society’s alienable property, (b) such an action would leave the other 
members of society worse off, and (c) those other members of society would be worse off 
even if the exploited coalition withdrew and took away only the property it currently owns. 
Leaving aside market socialism for a moment, let us imagine a generic society with an 
unspecified economic system, where significant inequality of income exists, and most 
people are employed as workers in companies managed by others (the ownership structure 
does not need to be specified). Let us consider a group of workers that possess a certain 
specific skill which requires some degree of training or experience, but who are 
nevertheless near the bottom of the income distribution. For example, adjunct professors, 
assuming they have the same wages as in contemporary capitalist society. Are they 
exploited, according to the Roemer definition? Yes, they are. First, because they are in the 
lower part of a significantly unequal income distribution, they would be better off in an 
arrangement where they withdrew from society with a proportional share of society’s 
alienable property. Second, because they would be taking with them significantly more 
wealth than they currently own, such an action would leave the other members of society 
worse off. And third, because the members of the coalition—the adjunct professors—
possess specific skills that require years of training, the rest of society would be worse off 
even if the coalition withdrew and took away only the property it currently owns, because it 
would be necessary to invest significant resources into training their replacements. 
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 Thus, any society that features an unequal distribution of income with certain 
groups of skilled workers receiving below-average income is an exploitative society 
according to Roemer's definition. And all historical market economies meet these criteria. 
Roemer's model of market socialism, which explicitly aims to set wages in precisely the 
same way as capitalism, would also meet these criteria. In order for a society to be non-
exploitative, a highly egalitarian distribution of income is required, at least among all 
groups of skilled workers. Such a distribution could only be guaranteed by some form of 
economic planning. 
1.4.2  Exploitation in a system of worker-owned firms 
 In addition to Roemer's model, it is also necessary to consider the issue of worker-
owned firms, which is the dominant economic arrangement in Alec Nove's vision of market 
socialism and which plays a significant role in many other concepts of market socialism, 
both historical and contemporary. Employee ownership is often presented as a socialist 
alternative to state ownership. Many socialists view employee ownership as a way to 
eliminate the exploitation associated with private ownership without having to suffer from 
the over-centralization and bureaucratic rigidity that they believe to be the inevitable result 
of state ownership. The popularity of these ideas has also resulted in much academic study 
of worker-owned firms (see for example Hansmann 1988). 
Worker-owned firms have many advantages. They put workers in control of the 
production process. They can achieve a much more egalitarian income distribution than 
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capitalist firms. Their profits are controlled—and either consumed or reinvested—by the 
workers themselves, without the intervention of a capitalist owner. This is all well and 
good, and any growth of worker-owned firms under capitalism would have benefits, but 
employee ownership within the context of a market economy cannot eliminate the 
possibility of capitalist exploitation. Employee ownership can only ensure that exploitation 
cannot occur within the firm. Some Marxists, focusing on the idea that exploitation happens 
in the process of production, may take it for granted that the process of production is 
contained within a single firm and therefore exploitation must also be contained within a 
single firm. But this is incorrect. One single production process may easily involve two or 
more firms. For this reason, lack of exploitation within the firm does not necessarily mean 
lack of exploitation in the process of production. 
Let us consider the following scenario: in our market socialist economy composed 
of co-ops, we have two firms, A and B. They are each owned by their respective 
employees. Firm A has recently purchased an oil refinery, and some of its members (i.e. 
worker-owners) have the knowledge to serve as managers of the refinery. But none of its 
members have the skills or the desire to go work there. Firm B, on the other hand, has 
plenty of members eager to do any work they can find, and some of them have the skills to 
work in an oil refinery. However, firm B is close to bankruptcy and its members are 
relatively poor (hence their willingness to do any work). If they cannot find a new source of 
income soon, firm B will have to be liquidated and its members will become unemployed. 
In this climate, firm A approaches firm B with a proposal: they will “collaborate” in using 
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the oil refinery. Firm A will provide the refinery itself, as well as the management staff. 
Firm B will provide all of the workers. All things produced by the refinery will be the 
property of firm A, who will sell them for a profit. In exchange, firm B will receive a 
steady and fixed stream of income from firm A. 
In the scenario I have just described, the workers of firm B find themselves in 
exactly the same situation they would face under capitalism. They do not own the means of 
production (the refinery). They must work to produce commodities for someone else (firm 
A), and that “someone else” will sell those commodities and make a profit. The workers 
themselves will get paid a wage, and—given standard market economy assumptions—this 
wage will represent only the value of labor-power, not the full value they created. Thus the 
workers will be producing surplus value for their exploiter. This may be called exploitation 
through subcontracting. One co-op, which owns means of production, is able to treat 
another co-op in precisely the same way a capitalist would treat a worker. Market socialism 
based on worker ownership allows exploitation to occur, and in a way similar to capitalist 
exploitation. One could even imagine a co-op that derives its entire income from exploiting 
others. This could happen, for example, if a co-op purchases a large amount of land and 
then focuses exclusively on being a landlord, getting all of its income in the form of rent. 
At this point, an objection may be raised: Couldn't the state, through legislation, 
make such exploitative relationships illegal? In theory it could, but only by significantly 
curtailing freedom of contract, in a way that would greatly skew the very market prices that 
are supposed to be the virtue of market socialism. Take, for example, the case of the co-op 
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that buys land for the purpose of charging rent. The state could pass legislation making it 
illegal for co-ops to charge rent for the use of their land. But that would cause the price of 
many pieces of land to drop significantly, as they are suddenly less attractive to prospective 
buyers. In other words, the price of land under market socialism would no longer be set by 
the same mechanism as under capitalism. Or take the case of the co-op that buys a refinery 
and subcontracts the labor to a different co-op. The state could pass legislation that would 
force the two firms to share the profits in such circumstances. But that may well make the 
refinery less attractive to prospective investors, and cause its price to fall. And every 
similar restriction would skew prices further, in various directions. This would defeat the 
entire point of market socialism, since its main appeal is based precisely on the claim that it 
can reach the same market prices as capitalism, which are considered by market socialists 
to be in some sense the correct prices at which the various commodities should be sold. 
Furthermore, the state would be playing a reactive role, forever having to identify the latest 
kinds of exploitative contracts and taking legal action against them. 
1.5  Conclusion 
It is not possible to disentangle a market system from exploitation. A market 
economy requires, if not private ownership, at least atomized ownership—and if not de 
jure, at least de facto. In other words, there must be a multitude of economic agents (either 
individuals or groups) that each have exclusive control over a portion of the means of 
production in society. They may or may not be legal owners, but they must have full 
control over the portion assigned to them, and the ability to choose which other people to 
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allow and which other people to exclude from the use of the means of production that are 
part of this portion. This type of arrangement, which we have named “atomized 
ownership,” is required in order for a market economy to function. And this same 
arrangement also makes exploitation possible, and indeed inevitable. Some economic 
agents will control a greater portion of society's means of production while others control a 
smaller portion or even none at all (and if this inequality does not exist from the beginning, 
the market system will soon generate it). Then, those agents that control greater portions 
will be able to leverage this to exploit the agents that control lesser portions or none at all. 
And, since those who can exploit others have a powerful incentive to actually go ahead and 
do it, we contend that market socialist models will inevitably generate exploitation, 
unearned income, class differences in society, and everything else that stems from these 
basic features. 
There is no way to fix this problem except by disallowing the ownership of means 
of production by independent profit-seeking agents (whether individuals, or co-ops, or 
managers who act as de facto owners). And if we cannot have independent profit-seeking 
agents, then we cannot have a market economy. 
Economic planning is not perfect. It is not a panacea. It may lead to some negative results. 
It may suffer from inefficiencies, just as a market economy does, although the 
inefficiencies of a planned economy are different from those of a market system. But 
economic planning remains the only principle on which it is possible to build an economic 
38 
 
system free from exploitation. Market socialism may be intellectually stimulating, but it is 



















THE DILEMMA OF INNOVATION IN SOCIALISM AND 
SOME POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
 
2.1  Introduction: The importance of innovation 
Debates regarding capitalism and socialism often revolve around the question of 
which system can make better use of a given set of resources under given conditions. In 
other words, they often focus on the issue of static efficiency. The meaning of "better use" 
in this context is open to interpretation, often becoming the most contentious part of the 
debate, but it is doubtful that either system is inherently more "efficient" than the other. 
The famous economic calculation debate, at its height in the 1920s and 1930s, focused on 
precisely such notions of static efficiency, and ended with Oskar Lange showing that 
socialism can reach any equilibrium that capitalism can reach. (Lange 1938) A similar 
point was also made earlier, by Enrico Barone in 1908, before the debate as such had even 
begun. Barone used a model of static equilibrium to show that, ceteris paribus, a socialist 
state must organize its planned economy in the same way that it would be organized by a 
perfectly competitive market economy, except perhaps with different incomes for various 
groups of individuals. (Barone 1935) Once a static equilibrium framework is chosen, the 
claim that a unique optimal allocation of resources exists has significant intuitive appeal. 
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Given enough trial and error, any economic system should gravitate toward that optimal 
allocation. The debate between capitalism and socialism then becomes a debate about 
which system is more likely to reach or approach the optimal allocation in practice. 
Analyses and comparisons of socialism and capitalism have long focused on this 
static approach, and even today, the most readily available critiques of Soviet socialism are 
based on its supposed static inefficiency. But static efficiency is always purely 
hypothetical. Equilibrium is never reached. A more important dimension to analyze is the 
difference between the two systems in terms of their paths of development. The ability of 
capitalism to promote technological innovation is a major reason for its historical success. 
European empires in the 19th and 20th centuries were able to extend capitalism throughout 
the world largely due to their technological edge. Closer to our time, the bewildering array 
of consumer products available under capitalism remains one of the main reasons why this 
economic system is attractive to large numbers of people. The lack of consumer goods on 
par with the West was one of the most important causes of popular discontent with Soviet-
type socialism. 
It is reasonable to expect that any future socialist societies will exist alongside 
capitalist societies in the world, for some time. They would undoubtedly become rivals, 
and in order for socialism to be successful, it must be able to withstand a multi-generational 
rivalry with capitalism. Innovation will play a crucial role in any such rivalry, in at least 
two ways: First, the popularity of each economic system will be affected by its ability to 
provide attractive consumer goods. This may not be the leading factor in people’s decisions 
41 
 
about which system to support, but it will certainly be a factor. Second, any international 
rivalry between capitalism and socialism will necessarily involve a military component. 
The society with the more technologically advanced military will have an advantage, even 
if no war actually takes place. 
2.2  Innovation under capitalism 
Capitalism is a dynamic economic system that has unquestionably generated a great 
deal of innovation. The rapid advancement of technology in capitalist societies over the 
course of the 19th and 20th centuries is well documented. This technological progress has 
been accompanied by a rise in living standards and general improvement in human welfare, 
which may be difficult to quantify but which is widely acknowledged to have been 
impressive, including by capitalism's critics. Indeed, the critics of capitalism spoke very 
favorably of its promotion of technological progress as early as the mid-19th century. 
(Marx and Engels 1978) 
How does capitalism promote innovation? The key ingredient is said to be 
competition. Private firms aim to maximize their profits, and so they pursue innovation in 
order to increase their profits and stay ahead of their competitors. For example, a firm that 
introduces a successful process innovation is able to produce its output at a lower cost and 
thereby undercut the competition. A firm that introduces a successful product innovation is 
able to entice buyers away from the competition. Potential investors are aware of these 
benefits, and provide financing for innovations in the hope of future returns. Some risk is 
involved, as not all research leads to innovations and not all innovations prove successful, 
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but investors can hedge against these risks by maintaining a sufficiently diverse portfolio. 
Finally, under perfect competition, the lack of barriers to entry ensures that new firms can 
enter any market where there is potential profit to be made by introducing an innovation. 
The same condition ensures the rapid diffusion of successful innovations, as other firms 
will see and copy the successful idea. 
One major problem with this picture is immediately apparent: In a competitive 
market with no barriers to entry, an innovating firm can only profit from its innovation for 
a very short time before competitors move in and copy its successful idea, driving profits 
back down. And if profits from a new innovation are too small, or too short-lived, then the 
original innovating firm will not even be able to recover the funds spent on research and 
development. As a result, paradoxically, too much competition can reduce or even 
eliminate the incentive for innovation, by rendering it unprofitable. The precise aspect of 
capitalism touted as its greatest virtue becomes a vice. 
To address this problem, governments in capitalist societies have universally 
decided to restrict competition by issuing patents and copyrights, thus effectively granting 
each innovating firm a monopoly over its innovation for a set period of time. This means 
that firms can look forward to monopoly profits from most types of innovations, which 
provide a greater incentive to innovate. Indeed, the political arguments in favor of patents 
and copyrights are always based on the idea that such laws are necessary to promote 
innovation, while copying is a form of theft because it deprives the innovator of profits 
derived from insight or creativity. 
43 
 
However, this means that diffusion (copying) of innovations is deliberately 
restricted, in order to create the necessary incentive for firms to engage in the other steps of 
the innovation process. An adequate incentive to innovate comes precisely from the 
guarantee that other firms will not be legally allowed to imitate the innovation, at least for 
some time. Thus, capitalism is faced with a tradeoff between the incentive to innovate and 
the speed of diffusion of new innovations. One can only be increased at the expense of the 
other. Also, crucially, the balance between these two concerns is not found endogenously, 
by market forces within capitalism itself. Rather, it is set externally by the government. 
Patent law is a matter of public policy. A public authority must decide how to balance the 
incentive for innovation with the speed of diffusion of new innovations. And up to the 
present day, there has been no attempt to quantify these two concerns or to find some 
mathematical optimum point between them. Rather, patent law is decided through the 
political process and largely dependent on the lobbying power of various large companies 
and interest groups. As such, there is no reason to believe that either the incentive to 
innovate or the speed of diffusion of new innovations is in any way "optimal" under 
capitalism. One or the other could well be lower than it should be, and there is no 
mechanism to detect this, let alone correct it. 
Thus, the size of the incentive to innovate under capitalism is largely determined by 
public policy, and this public policy in turn is determined by the balance of political forces 
between various classes and interest groups. Many large firms lobby for legislation that 
would grant them greater monopoly profits, while small firms, consumers’ groups, small 
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farmers and others often lobby against such legislation. When this issue is not given much 
attention in the general political environment (such as today), voters who support a given 
political party for unrelated reasons may help to increase or decrease monopoly profits 
unintentionally. There is no reason to expect that at any time the degree of monopoly 
power, based on relative political forces, will give rise to an outcome that is good for 
society in the area of innovation. If such a thing as an "optimal" rate of innovation exists, 
there is no inherent tendency under capitalism to approach that particular rate. There is also 
no way to calculate even theoretically what that rate might be. All that can be said is that 
the rate of innovation under capitalism generally appears to be quite high, compared to 
other economic systems. 
There is also another way in which innovation under capitalism depends on factors 
outside of the capitalist economic system itself. Theoretical scientific research is to a large 
extent supported by public funds and philanthropic or charitable donations. This is the sort 
of research that does not have commercial or even industrial applications in and of itself, 
but often forms the basis on which other, more specific technological innovations are later 
based. Numerous modern technologies could not have existed without developments in 
theoretical physics that were not in and of themselves profitable, and some transformative 
commercial innovations - for example the internet - were originally based on publicly 
funded military research. This reliance on basic research done for reasons other than the 
profit motive is not a flaw in capitalism, but it may be a reason to doubt capitalism's 
superiority in matters of innovation. After all, if a capitalist state can fund not-for-profit 
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research, then so can a socialist state. To the extent that capitalist innovation relies on 
publicly funded research, this cannot be claimed as a uniquely capitalist phenomenon, and 
there is no reason to expect a capitalist system to be necessarily any better at this than other 
systems. 
Notwithstanding the issues discussed above, the fact remains that capitalism 
produces a great number of innovations and is able to continue doing so over long periods 
of time. Perhaps they are not diffused as rapidly as they should be, perhaps the monopoly 
profits acquired by innovating firms are too great and lead to unnecessary inequalities, and 
perhaps the role of the state and non-profit institutions is such that the unique features of 
capitalism are only partly responsible for the innovations that occur under this economic 
system. Nevertheless, the record of capitalist innovation is impressive. 
The incentive to innovate under capitalism is strong precisely because of the 
inefficiency of the process, in the sense that the decision to innovate in capitalism does not 
take social costs into account. Every time a new innovation is introduced, there are winners 
and losers. Even in the most basic scenario where only a new consumer product is 
introduced, there are winners (consumers) and losers (workers making the old products 
which were replaced by the new one, as well as workers in the supply chain of the old 
product). Thus, for each innovation, it is worth asking if the benefit is greater than the harm 
and if gains and losses are equitably distributed. 
As noted above, the main driving force of innovation under capitalism is the pursuit 
of private profit, with some assistance from public funding for scientific research. Process 
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innovations are made for the purpose of cutting costs and increasing the profitability of 
private companies, while product innovations are made for the purpose of enticing new 
buyers and growing the firm's revenue (and thus, ceteris paribus, increasing profitability as 
well). As a result, innovation under capitalism is individualistic, or atomistic. It is done for 
the purpose of increasingly the utility of specific individuals (the owners or shareholders of 
a firm, the consumers of a specific product), with no regard for the impact on society as a 
whole. If innovations had no impact on those who did not use them, there would be no 
problem - we could say that any innovation which improves the personal utility of those 
who use it is also a net gain to society. But in fact, the introduction of almost any new 
innovation has a major impact on third parties far beyond its immediate users. We could 
say that most innovations exhibit "externalities" of a sort, which can be positive or 
negative. 
Negative externalities include several textbook examples, such as pollution and 
climate change. New innovations will be profitable if they utilize the cheapest energy 
sources, and those are often fossil fuels. The continued development of technology based 
on fossil fuels may impose immense costs on future generations, but as long as those costs 
are not felt by the firms developing the technologies in question or by their buyers, there is 
no incentive under capitalism to pursue different avenues of research. Governments may 
attempt to change the incentive structure through such measures as carbon taxes or carbon 




In addition, negative externalities associated with innovation can take some less 
conventional forms. Innovations have the potential to render whole industries obsolete, and 
when such an industry is the main employer in a geographical area, this can lead towns or 
even whole cities to suffer an economic collapse from which they never recover. 
Capitalism involves a process of creative destruction that sometimes leaves large 
populations in long-term structural unemployment, as new jobs are created thousands of 
miles away from the place where old jobs were lost, and require an entirely different set of 
skills. This type of cost plays no role in any decisions regarding the innovation process 
under capitalism, and it could be said to represent a "temporal" negative externality: 
workers lose future earnings. 
The temporal aspect of negative externalities associated with some innovations - the 
fact that they impose costs on third parties in the future much more than in the present - 
makes it especially difficult to handle this problem through the usual policies that are used 
to correct negative externalities under capitalism. These policies typically rely on property 
rights: the third party that is negatively impacted by some transaction can be granted a 
property right such that the negative impact represents an infringement of that right, which 
enables the third party to negotiate (and, if necessary, bring the matter to court) in defense 
of its interests. In other words, the costs are internalized. However, under capitalism, 
workers cannot have a property right over their employment, so that they could claim 
compensation if their jobs disappear or their skills are rendered obsolete by innovation. 
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Neither is it possible to establish property rights over a highly uncertain future so that 
individuals could claim compensation for future hardship caused by climate change. 
There is one final problem with capitalist innovation that may fall under the broad 
concept of a "negative externality". There are some innovations that can place consumers 
or firms in a situation akin to a Prisoner's Dilemma. Suppose that there is some innovation 
which, if widely adopted in society, provides no net benefits or perhaps even causes a net 
decrease in utility for all agents who adopt it. But suppose that this innovation does provide 
significant net benefits to the first few agents who adopt it, as long as no one else has 
adopted it yet. Thus we have an "Innovator's Dilemma": the socially rational choice would 
be for no one to adopt the innovation, but the individually rational choice is to adopt the 
innovation first before anyone else does. In capitalism, innovations of this type will always 
be widely adopted. 
There are also innovations that have significant positive externalities, including 
product innovations that are public goods and process innovations that benefit the 
community around the firm which adopts them. Capitalism is very likely to neglect such 
innovations, and capitalist firms are likely to ignore avenues of research that may result in 
them. This is not a trivial matter affecting only a few select public goods. The entire 
technological trajectory of a society can be changed if it focuses almost exclusively on 
innovations that are intended to lead to profitable private goods. For example, it is entirely 
possible that there are potential innovations to be made in the realm of public transportation 
that capitalism has not made because of its private goods bias. Likewise, it is possible that 
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capitalism has privileged private entertainment at the expense of public entertainment, and 
so on. 
Of course, we cannot know what innovations would have been made if we had 
different economic institutions, but the point is that the cost-benefit calculation under 
capitalism includes only private costs and benefits to the innovating firm. This can lead to 
some innovations being produced and disseminated even though they are a net loss to 
society. Or, conversely, it can lead to some innovations not being pursued because they are 
not profitable, although they would have considerable net social benefit. Here we have a 
powerful counter-argument to Enrico Barone's contention that capitalism and socialism are 
just two different means to reach the same end. In a static world that may be true, but in a 
dynamic world, capitalism and socialism will make different innovations and develop 
different technologies. This means that they are not, in fact, both trying to reach the same 
optimal allocation of resources. The results achieved by socialism are not equivalent to the 
results that could be achieved by capitalism with an appropriately egalitarian set of initial 
resource endowments. 
2.3  Innovation under socialism 
Having surveyed some of the shortcomings of the capitalist approach to innovation, 
the question then becomes if socialism - or some type of socialism - can do better. Here, we 
must define what we mean by "socialism." We will not discuss the idea of market 
socialism, for the reasons described in the previous essay, but also because a market 
socialist system, which still relies on competition between profit-seeking firms and merely 
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changes the ownership structure of those firms, would approach innovation in precisely the 
same way as capitalism and could therefore be expected to share the same advantages and 
disadvantages as capitalism. This is yet another way in which the idea of market socialism 
seems destined to produce the same results as capitalism. 
The socialism to be discussed in this section is therefore based on a planned 
economy with social ownership of productive property. This definition is broad enough to 
include a wide variety of different socialist economic systems, from the authoritarian 
Soviet model to various kinds of democratically planned socialist models. The Soviet 
model is the one type of socialism for which we have abundant historical data, so it should 
serve as the starting point for any analysis of the benefits and problems of socialism. 
However, that model has very few advocates today, and there is broad agreement that any 
future socialism must be substantially different from it and must contain strong democratic 
elements. Such elements can provide solutions to many of the flaws of the Soviet model, 
including with regard to innovation, although as we will argue below, democracy would 
not necessarily provide an easy solution to all possible problems of the innovation process 
under socialism. 
2.3.1  Soviet socialism and innovation 
The Soviet model of socialism was presented by its advocates as a technologically 
progressive economy, and there was some merit in this view. The Soviet model certainly 
achieved rapid industrialization and sustained high levels of economic growth for several 
decades, which included the development and dissemination of new technologies. The 
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Soviet Union pioneered space exploration, and was a world leader in theoretical sciences. It 
developed advanced military technology, and also civilian technology in a number of 
fields. Soviet eye surgery equipment and seamless rail laying machines, for example, were 
among the best in the world by the 1970s. (Berliner 1976) Labor productivity also grew 
rapidly until 1975. (Kotz and Weir 2007) 
Several arguments were made in favor of the potential of the Soviet model for 
innovation. It was argued that the Soviet model could innovate more efficiently and 
disseminate innovations more rapidly than capitalism, because there were no private firms 
with a desire to maintain trade secrets, there were no patent laws to limit or slow down the 
spread of new technologies, and there was no wasteful competition as in capitalism 
(wasteful in the sense that different capitalist firms may duplicate efforts as they each try to 
independently develop similar technologies ahead of the competition). In addition, the 
Soviet system encouraged scientific education, provided ample funding for basic research, 
and had a variety of institutions with an explicit mandate to produce innovations. These 
included R&D Institutes, the State Committee for Innovation and Discovery, the technical 
departments of the industrial ministries, and also local design departments in many 
individual enterprises. The profit motive was absent, but in its place there was a central 
plan that encouraged innovation by raising enterprise labor productivity targets each year 
and through other administrative methods. The Soviet state made some efforts to encourage 
amateur innovators as well. 
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Yet for all that, and in spite of the very real successes of Soviet innovation in some 
areas, the system had major flaws pulling it in a technologically conservative direction and 
ultimately preventing it from outpacing capitalism in the invention and application of new 
technologies. These flaws were first of all present in the incentives faced by enterprise 
directors. The primary goal they were given was to fulfill the production targets in the 
current economic plan, and their monetary incentives were largely focused on this. As a 
result, small process innovations that had obvious benefits were adopted quite readily in 
order to increase productivity, but more significant innovations were simply too risky to 
adopt in most cases. The incentives called for continuing with tried-and-true methods that 
guaranteed fulfillment of the plan, rather than risking doing something new that may or 
may not work as intended. This was especially true given the policy of "taut planning," 
which aimed to provide each enterprise with precisely the inputs it appeared to require to 
reach its output target, and no more than that. This meant that any delay or minor error 
could cause an enterprise to miss its plan targets, and most directors were not keen to 
increase their risk by introducing innovations. 
Competition under capitalism may cause the "Innovator's Dilemma" mentioned in 
the previous section, pressuring firms to innovate even when it would be better not to do 
so, but the Soviet model had in some ways an opposite problem: lack of negative 
consequences for a failure to innovate. Enterprises could not be driven out of business by 
more innovative rivals, and neither were they closed or downsized or otherwise punished if 
they remained technologically conservative. 
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The Soviet system did not suffer from the capitalist bias towards private goods in 
the innovation process. It developed an excellent public transport network, for instance, 
both within cities and throughout the country. However, the Soviet system did suffer from 
a bias in favor of what might be called "prestige goods". Throughout its existence, but 
especially during the Cold War, the USSR repeatedly attempted to demonstrate its 
superiority over its capitalist rivals by investing heavily in projects that were designed to be 
more eye-catching than useful, and also by focusing excessively on military spending and 
military technologies. This is sometimes called the problem of "planners' preferences", but 
it should be noted that Soviet economic planners, despite their considerable power and lack 
of popular oversight, did not generally allocate extensive resources for their own private 
consumption. Rather, they allocated extensive resources to boost national prestige. 
Finally, in terms of the environmental impact of innovation, the Soviet model was 
no better than capitalism, and in many ways it was worse. Like capitalism, it also did not 
seek to develop innovations with a lower environmental cost. However, unlike capitalism, 
the Soviet system did not have any internal mechanism that would compel firms to seek the 
most profitable innovations regardless of environmental impact. Soviet planners or the top 
political leadership could have simply chosen to protect the environment, if they had 
wished. They did not wish to do so, and the undemocratic character of the system enabled 
them to remain on their chosen path regardless of public opinion. 
54 
 
2.3.2  Democratically planned socialism and innovation 
There have been several different proposed models for a democratically planned 
socialist economy, including the system of negotiated coordination put forward by Devine 
(1988), the participatory economics envisioned by Albert and Hahnel (1991), and the 
computerized "new socialism" of Cockshott and Cottrell (1993). They differ in important 
respects, but they all share similar criticisms of the Soviet system and propose a type of 
socialism that is more democratic, both in the state and within the workplace. This has 
important consequences for innovation. 
First, merely having an open and democratic society, with elected representatives 
answerable to a voting public, would go a long way towards fixing some of the 
shortcomings of the Soviet model. Such a society would not invest in useless "prestige 
goods" that do not improve anyone's welfare, and - assuming that voters are concerned 
about their own future and that of their children - steps would be taken to develop 
environmentally-friendly technologies and innovations that make use of renewable energy 
sources. 
However, democracy would not automatically remove the incentives towards 
technological conservatism faced by enterprises in the Soviet model. Workplace 
democracy, an important element of any participatory model of socialism, is not inherently 
technologically progressive, any more than political democracy. If the workers of an 
enterprise control their own workplace but face the same external incentives as Soviet 
enterprise directors, then they will act the same as those directors with respect to 
55 
 
innovation. Therefore, planning institutions and incentives would have to be designed 
differently in order to encourage the widespread adoption of innovations by enterprises. 
Taut planning would have to be abandoned, and enterprises should not be 
discouraged from taking risks. The incentive structure should be less focused on penalties 
for failure and provide more rewards for unexpected success, compared to the Soviet 
model. Communication should be encouraged between enterprises and their suppliers, and 
in fact it would be entirely feasible and desirable to make all economic information 
publicly available. This did not happen in the Soviet model, which operated under a siege 
mentality and placed a high emphasis on secrecy. 
At the same time, the benefits of the Soviet model could be maintained: high 
investment in basic science, public goods being given adequate importance, and the free 
circulation of technical knowledge without legal barriers imposed by patents or copyrights. 
A democratically planned socialist economy would not suffer from the 
shortcomings of innovation under capitalism. The direction of research and investment in 
the pursuit of innovations in various fields could become matters of public debate. It could 
be democratically decided, for example, whether to invest in the pursuit of more efficient 
electric cars or modernize the rail network instead. Thus, public and private goods could be 
placed on a level playing field. Innovations that are socially harmful could simply be 
abandoned or not pursued in the first place, even when they are such that a private firm 
could have gained an advantage in the marketplace by being the first to adopt them. 
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Providing adequate incentives to innovate, and ensuring the dissemination of useful 
innovations, would be a matter of public policy. There would be an elected body with the 
mandate to oversee the various research institutions, to provide adequate resources to 
individual inventors, and to promote the adoption of new technologies and the development 
of new products by enterprises. The precise nature of such a body, and its membership, 
would have to depend on which model of democratically planned socialism we have in 
mind. 
2.4  The dilemma of innovation in socialism 
We can anticipate one major source of potential problems related to innovation in a 
democratically planned socialist economy: What if rapid innovation proves unpopular? 
Innovation is inherently disruptive, because it destroys jobs and industries. As old 
technologies are superseded, product lines become obsolete, production processes are 
changed, and certain kinds of jobs are no longer needed. Thus, technological progress leads 
to insecurity about the future of one's job. Even with an employment guarantee, the loss of 
one's job may have to involve retraining, changing careers, or moving across the country. 
Therefore we can expect opposition to the implementation of certain beneficial 
innovations, and we can expect that, at least in some cases, this opposition will be 
successful. 
 Workers may oppose disruptive innovations in their capacity as workers. But in 
their capacity as consumers, they will demand new and better products, which would 
sometimes require disruptive innovation. This may be regarded as an internal contradiction 
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of socialism. We can have cutting-edge consumer products, or we can have stable 
employment, but perhaps not both. In a democratically planned socialist economy, the 
voters will be able to decide between one and the other, on a case-by-case basis, so that 
some innovations will be pursued, others will be scrapped because of their disruptive 
effects, and some will be introduced at a deliberately slow pace. 
Meanwhile, capitalism always comes down in favor of the new consumer products 
every time they conflict with stable jobs. Since socialism will not always do this, it is likely 
that socialism will have more job security but fewer cutting-edge consumer products than 
capitalism. 
If there is an international rivalry between socialism and capitalism, the citizens of 
the two kinds of societies will be able to compare their lifestyles with those in the other 
economic system. Workers living under capitalism may be attracted by the stable jobs, 
shorter working hours, democratic workplaces and social benefits (such as universal 
healthcare and education) provided by socialism. However, those living under socialism 
will probably also be attracted by the superior consumer goods available under capitalism. 
Moreover, as long as the speed of innovation in socialism is lower than that in capitalism, 
the “consumer gap” with capitalism would grow over time. The difference between the 
consumer goods available in capitalism and those available in socialism would steadily 
become wider. 
This may not be considered a problem for socialism if people value stable jobs 
more than new consumer goods, but not everyone does. In our scenario, we are assuming 
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that the majority of people living in socialism value stable jobs more – because that is the 
reason for the consumer gap in the first place – but there would be a minority who disagree. 
If the consumer gap is large enough, and/or that dissenting minority has such an overriding 
preference for consumer goods that it outweighs any other benefits they might receive from 
socialism, then we have a category of people with a material interest in supporting 
capitalism, even though they are part of the working class. 
The fact that some workers in a socialist society might prefer capitalism because of 
better consumer goods is not a novel observation. In fact, this exact phenomenon played a 
role in the demise of the Soviet system. However, it is a problem that has not been 
sufficiently studied by advocates of socialism. In general, the response to the flaws of 
Soviet socialism has been to propose other models of socialism that would not have those 
flaws. But the tradeoff between job security and innovation doesn't appear to be one that 
can be easily eliminated within socialism. It is not due to the overly centralized or 
undemocratic nature of the Soviet model, but rather due to the nature of innovation itself. 
Furthermore, there is a military aspect to the innovation problem, which did not 
affect Soviet socialism because Soviet planners always placed a strong emphasis on 
military technology and development, but which may affect democratically planned 
socialism. Innovations that aid the military but have no effect on the welfare of ordinary 
people are also likely to have a disruptive effect on employment, as in the case of 
consumer-oriented innovations. If tanks become obsolete and are to be replaced by a better 
technology, then tank factories might have to be closed, and the lives of the people working 
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there would be disrupted. This is likely to face democratic popular opposition, especially 
since, in this case, the job disruption does not even bring any improvement in living 
standards. 
This is a problem because it might put socialism at a military disadvantage with 
respect to capitalism, which would hurt the socialist side in international relations even if 
no military conflict takes place. Suppose we have a situation of international rivalry 
between two sides. If one side knows it would lose any war that did take place, then that 
side will act timidly and avoid even non-violent confrontation, so as not to provoke the 
other side into war. Thus, it would be difficult for such a socialist side to prevail in a long-
term rivalry, even if it is a peaceful one. For both sides to stand a good chance of success in 
a peaceful rivalry, they must be more or less evenly matched militarily, in the sense that it 
must be open to debate which side would win in case of a war, so that neither one feels that 
it can do whatever it wants with impunity or that it must tread lightly and avoid 
confrontation. 
The Cold War was a multi-faceted struggle between two different international 
economic orders. Any future socialist economic order will most likely have to face 
capitalism in a somewhat similar struggle. Can such a struggle be won by socialism without 
matching capitalism's rate of technological development? That is the question. 
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2.5  Possible solutions 
One option is to simply accept this as a positive feature of socialism, even if it does 
come with certain disadvantages. If the rate of innovation has been slowed down by 
democratic decisions, some may ask, "What is the problem? The people have decided that 
it is better to advance slower, and that is a valid choice." It may be a valid choice, and it 
may even be one of the best features of socialism that it does not force people to constantly 
switch jobs and uproot their lives. In contemporary capitalism, “flexibility” has become a 
byword for “insecurity.” Many people would appreciate less “flexibility” in their careers 
and work schedules. 
However, if this choice caused the socialist society to lag behind rival capitalist 
societies in technological development, that would be dangerous for the long-term survival 
of socialism, as detailed above. Under certain favorable circumstances, perhaps the 
problem could be ignored. For example, if socialism begins by taking hold in the most 
technologically advanced countries, the faster rate of innovation under capitalism would 
only help the capitalist societies to catch up over time. As we’ve seen from the Cold War of 
the 20th century, it is entirely possible for the society that is catching up to lose the race to 
the one that began with a sufficiently large head start. In other words, there may be no 
problem if Orthodox Marxism ends up being right about where the transition to socialism is 
likely to begin in the future. 
Discounting the possibility of exogenous factors giving a technological advantage 
to socialism over capitalism, is there some way to overcome the problem entirely, to 
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eliminate the tradeoff between job stability and technological innovation? There might be. 
Technological development could reach a point at which the kinds of jobs that can be 
threatened by innovation have already been automated. For example, the forces of 
production could develop to the point at which all the actual physical production is done 
entirely by machines, and the only human labor still needed is creative labor such as 
designing new products or new technologies, programming computers, and so on. In that 
case, innovation would not have to disrupt anyone’s job, because creating innovations is 
the only job that human beings still do. Technological progress itself could save us from 
the downsides of technological progress. We are not at that point yet, obviously, but we 
could reach it before the next transition to socialism occurs. 
Both of the options above are possible, but they essentially rely on luck. There is 
not much that anyone could do to make them happen. What if the future socialist society is 
“unlucky”, and has neither a technological head start nor the ability to completely automate 
all physical production? Then the socialist society would face the tradeoff between job 
stability and technological innovation, while competing with advanced capitalist societies. 
This was, in fact, the situation that all past socialist experiments faced. What is to be done 
in such a case? 
One option would be for socialism to provide only a general employment guarantee, 
without a guarantee of maintaining the same job or even a job in the same enterprise. In 
other words, socialism would sacrifice job stability (but not security) for the sake of 
innovation. This is a simple option, viable in all circumstances. The problem is that it 
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would diminish the benefits of socialism over capitalism, because it essentially amounts to 
making socialist enterprises behave a bit more like capitalist ones. In addition, this option 
may not be popular with the voting public. It could be combined with compensation 
packages given to workers who are forced to change jobs. Sufficiently large compensation 
packages could make up for the disruption of involuntarily changing jobs to such an extent 
that it is no longer regarded as a net negative by the workers experiencing it. However, that 
could be quite costly for the rest of society, if innovation frequently renders jobs obsolete. 
Another option would be to have “social priority campaigns” in response to 
challenges from capitalism. If the socialist society finds itself slipping behind 
technologically in a certain area that is considered particularly important by the voting 
public, a campaign could be launched to improve that specific type of technology and 
overhaul the specific industry in question. In other words, job stability could be the general 
rule, but exceptions could be declared in special circumstances. This could also be 
combined with compensation packages given to workers who are forced to change jobs, 
and it would be less costly to make them quite large in this scenario, because they would be 
less common. 
A third option would be to import an attractive but socially costly new product from 
the capitalist world for a time while only gradually introducing production of it. After all, 
consumers only want to get the new product, not to produce it. This might be a cynical 
response, since it amounts to unloading the social costs of the new product onto the 
capitalist world, but it could also be seen as using capitalism against itself. It may not 
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always be a viable option, however. The capitalist world is likely to impose embargoes on 
exporting certain goods to the socialist world – especially those with military applications. 
Other options for resolving this dilemma may also exist, and several options may be 
combined. It is possible that different socialist societies will handle this problem 
differently. It is also possible to imagine a socialist city-state full of enterprising people 
who enjoy changing jobs on a regular basis, who do not regard the social costs of 
innovation as being costs at all. However, it is important to acknowledge that this problem 

















SOVIET-TYPE SOCIALISM AND THE TRANSITION TO 
CAPITALISM: WHICH IS THE FAILURE? 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War, the dominant narrative about socialist economies of 
the Soviet type has been one of failure and inefficiency. They are said to have been unable 
to provide the same living standards as capitalism, or unable to maintain economic growth, 
or unable to adapt to the requirements of the current stage of technological development. 
This failure is widely considered one of the major causes (if not the sole cause) of the fall 
of the Soviet Union and its allied governments in Eastern Europe. And, at first glance, the 
evidence supports this assessment. Soviet-type economies had experienced impressive 
growth rates from the 1930s to the early 1960s (minus, of course, the years of the Second 
World War), and one of the declared aims of the USSR in the Cold War was to eventually 
overtake the United States as the world's leading economic power. But, starting in the mid-
1970s, a period of economic stagnation set in. Growth rates were no longer enough to allow 
the Soviet-type economies to catch up to the West. In fact, some of them were even starting 
to fall farther behind. This new economic reality generated a combination of popular 
discontent and destabilizing market reforms that resulted in the fall of the USSR and its 
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allied governments, and the transition of all former socialist economies in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia toward capitalism. 
So it would seem that the Soviet-type economies did indeed fail to meet 
expectations. But failure to meet expectations is not necessarily an indication of an inferior 
economic model. It can also be an indication of inflated expectations. And the early 
expectations about the Soviet economic model were certainly high. In the 1960s and early 
70s it was hoped that living standards in Eastern Europe could catch up to Western living 
standards, and perhaps even overtake them, in a single generation. The Soviet-type 
economies proved unable to live up to this dream. But did they "fail" in an absolute sense? 
Is a socialist planned economy inferior to capitalism? To find an answer to this question, it 
is necessary to actually compare economic performance under socialism and capitalism, 
and not merely to measure the results of Soviet-type socialism against the high standard of 
catching up to the most advanced capitalist economies. After all, regardless of economic 
system, only a few countries that started at a low level of development compared to the 
leading capitalist countries have yet caught up. 
How does one compare the economic performance of socialist economies against 
capitalist economies? A popular approach during the Cold War was to make "East vs. 
West" comparisons. These typically found the predictable result that the West had a higher 
level of living standards but the East had a higher rate of economic growth and therefore 
improvement in living standards (prior to the stagnation period). However, there were 
inevitable problems with such comparisons. Today there is a new way to address this as a 
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result of the now long completed transition to capitalism. Ideally, a comparative study 
should seek to look at pairs of countries that are as similar as possible except for their 
economic systems. But there were a vast number of differences between Eastern and 
Western Europe (or between the USSR and the USA), by no means limited to their 
economic systems. They began to industrialize at different times in history, some were 
ravaged by war and others were not, some were far more urbanized than others, they had 
different cultures, and so on.1 Secondly, "capitalism" does not mean "what exists in 
Western Europe and North America". By no definition of capitalism can we say that the 
capitalist world (and therefore its economic performance) is represented by the developed 
countries of the West and them alone. The Global South was (and is) also largely 
composed of capitalist societies. There is no reason to pick France and the United States as 
the benchmarks of capitalism-in-general, as opposed to, say, Brazil and Honduras. 
For these reasons, we propose a different approach in evaluating Soviet-type 
socialism against capitalism: "East vs. East" comparisons. The countries which formerly 
had socialist economies have now spent over a quarter-century with capitalism. It has 
become possible to take a long-term view of their experience with capitalism, and ask 
whether it has been superior or inferior to their experience with the Soviet model of 
socialism. The narrative of the "failure" of Soviet socialism would imply that the transition 
to capitalism should have brought major economic improvements - at least in the long term. 
                                                             
1 This does not apply in the case of comparisons between West Germany and East Germany, but that 
specific case cannot be considered representative of the two economic systems in general. Additionally, 
even the two German states did not start with the same infrastructure or the same treatment by the Allies. 
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And we are now at a point where we can study the long term effects of the transition to 
capitalism and compare them with the previous period. This is the aim of the present paper. 
3.2  Historical economic performance and trends 
 Twenty-two countries have been selected for study in the present paper. They 
consist of the fifteen former republics of the USSR, plus seven states in East-Central 
Europe that had socialist economies of the Soviet type during the Cold War period: 
Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. East 
Germany was excluded because German reunification makes it a special case (it was 
absorbed into a larger capitalist country rather than transitioning independently), and 
because of the difficulty in finding post-1990 data for the former East Germany. Likewise, 
Yugoslavia and the ex-Yugoslav states have been excluded, because they are a special case. 
The economic system they had before 1990 was a form of market socialism, rather than a 
socialist planned economy of the Soviet type, and in the economic data for the 1990s it is 
impossible to disentangle the effects of the transition to capitalism from the effects of the 
Yugoslav wars. 
The twenty-two countries we have selected did not use precisely the same economic 
model in the socialist period. While Soviet-type economic planning and state enterprises 
were dominant in all of them, many of them also incorporated market activities to varying 
degrees. Poland and Hungary allowed a greater scope for the market than Albania or the 
Soviet Union, for example. Nevertheless, the twenty-two countries were sufficiently similar 
to make comparisons meaningful. 
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 The economic variable we have chosen to focus on is GDP per capita, because it is 
commonly used as a proxy for living standards. It is true that this is a highly imperfect 
proxy, since it ignores income distribution and positive and negative externalities, and is 
only loosely correlated with other important indicators of human welfare such as life 
expectancy and infant mortality. Nevertheless, both Soviet and Western economists and 
government officials used the rate of growth of output per capita as a measure of success 
(the Soviets used NMP rather than GDP, but it was still intended to be a measure of 
output). This paper focuses on GDP per capita because both advocates and critics of the 
Soviet system focus on it (or on other measures of output) to evaluate performance. 
The Total Economy Database (The Conference Board 2016) provides data on GDP 
per capita in 2015 US dollars, with updated 2011 purchasing power parities. These are the 
numbers that we will use in what follows. The available data begins in 1980 for the former 
SSRs, in 1985 for Slovakia, in 1970 for the Czech Republic, and in 1950 for the other 
states of East-Central Europe. As a result, it does not allow us to draw conclusions about 
Soviet-type socialism before the stagnation period. 
 With the available data, the picture that emerges is a familiar one. Nearly all the 
states under consideration followed the same basic pattern: Slow positive growth, 
stagnation or a slow decline in the 1980s, followed by a sharp economic collapse in the 
1990s (the first phase of transition), followed by recovery and continued growth at various 
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rates up to the present day.2 A major factor in determining the present-day situation is the 













                                                             
2 Since these are graphs showing the level of GDP per capita with a linear scale on the y-axis, a constant 
slope does not indicate a constant growth rate. A constant growth rate generates an exponential curve. 
Where the curve is linear, that indicates a falling growth rate. 
 



















































































































































This raw data is not very useful for the purpose of comparisons between countries, 
however, since they often begin at very different levels of GDP per capita at the start of the 
relevant period. For this reason, we have constructed a second set of graphs using 
normalized data. In figures 2.1 - 2.5, the level of GDP per capita in the year 1985 is 
normalized to 1, allowing for direct comparisons between the transition experiences of 
different countries. The year 1985 was chosen as the starting point for two reasons. It is the 
first year for which we have a complete data set (since there is no earlier data for Slovakia), 
and it is also the last year before Perestroika was introduced in the USSR. We will continue 






















































































































3.3  Transition versus stagnation, by country 
 The normalized data and graphs can help us to see which countries eventually 
recovered their pre-transition levels of GDP per capita, and how long it took them to do so. 
However, this is insufficient. We cannot simply declare that recovering the pre-transition 
level represents the mark of success for capitalism, because in the absence of transition, the 
Soviet-type economies would not have simply remained at their 1985 level of GDP per 
capita forever. It is reasonable to assume that the GDP growth rate in the last part of the 
Soviet model period would have continued in the absence of transition. In most cases that 
growth rate was positive and stable, although low. 
 In order to properly evaluate the performance of capitalism and compare it with the 
performance of Soviet-type socialism, we require an estimate of where the countries of 
Eastern Europe and the former USSR would have been today if they had kept their old 
economic model. For this purpose, we have constructed a "stagnation path" to estimate per 
capita GDPs in the 1990s and 2000s in the absence of transition to capitalism. The 
stagnation path is based on taking the mean growth rate for the years 1980-1988 (or 1985-
88 in the case of Slovakia) and projecting this growth rate into the future. The year 1989 
was excluded from this calculation because in many countries the effects of transition were 
already being felt. 
 The purpose of the stagnation path is to provide an estimate of where the Soviet-
type economies might have been today if they did little or nothing to improve themselves – 
if no major reforms were undertaken. It is intentionally based on the growth performance of 
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the worst decade of Soviet-type socialism. It is not meant to be an estimate of the real 
potential for growth of the Soviet-type economies. That would require a much more 
complex model based on the specific conditions of each country. It is possible to imagine 
scenarios in which successful reforms improved growth rates without abolishing socialism. 
For instance, the Soviet-type economies could have made use of new computer technology 
to improve planning, they could have changed the incentive structure for enterprise 
managers to encourage the adoption of new technologies, they could have abandoned taut 
planning in order to reduce shortages, and they could have shifted investment away from 
the traditional priority of heavy industry. It seems unlikely that they would have simply 
accepted decades of continued stagnation without any attempts to improve economic 
performance within the Soviet system. However, in a pessimistic scenario, it is possible 
that all such attempts would have failed. That is another way to look at the stagnation path: 
as the result of a situation where political leaders are committed to preserving socialism, 
but it turns out that there is no way to improve performance within (this type of) socialism. 
In other words, the concept of a stagnation path for Soviet-type economies “continuing 
without reform” does not necessarily refer to a scenario where no reform is attempted, but 
rather refers to a scenario where no reform within socialism is successful, and no transition 
to capitalism is attempted. 
In any case, the stagnation path is meant to be deliberately pessimistic, and to set a 
low bar for the comparison with capitalism. The intention is to provide a minimal baseline: 
in order for capitalism to be deemed superior to the Soviet model, it should at least be able 
78 
 
to do better than a pessimistic projection of the Soviet model in stagnation. The resulting 
comparisons, by country, are presented in figures 3.1 - 3.22. Each of these figures displays 
the estimated trajectory of continued stagnation compared with actual historical data for a 
given country. The countries are arranged by geographical region as follows: East-Central 
Europe, ex-Soviet Eastern Europe and Russia, the Baltic states, the South Caucasus, and 
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Several things can be observed from this data. First, all of the ex-Soviet republics 
experienced a dramatic collapse of GDP per capita (and living standards) in the early 
1990s. This placed the historical figures for that decade well below the estimated trajectory 
of continued stagnation, even in those cases where the estimated trajectory has a negative 
growth rate. The immediate aftermath of the collapse of the USSR was certainly far worse 
than any continued stagnation, or even gradual decline. The countries of East-Central 
Europe also experienced an early 1990s collapse, but far less severe. 
 Then, at varying points between the mid-1990s and early 2000s, all of the countries 
begin to experience a sustained recovery, which places them on an upward trajectory again 
 
















(interrupted, for some of them, by the global recession of 2008-09). However, the degree of 
recovery varies greatly, both compared to the pre-collapse GDP per capita and compared to 
the estimated trajectory in the absence of transition. 
 Four countries, all of them ex-SSRs (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Tajikistan) have 
still not recovered their 1985 levels of GDP per capita as of 2016. The effects of transition 
in their case can be described as catastrophic: not one, but three consecutive lost decades. 
 Four other countries (Russia, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, Hungary) have surpassed their 
1985 levels - in some cases by a considerable margin - but they have not surpassed the 
stagnation trajectory. In other words, they recovered from the initial collapse, but they did 
not recover all the way to where they may have been if they did not pursue transition to 
capitalism in the first place. Thus, the net effect of transition can be considered negative for 
them. It is noteworthy that this group includes Russia, which is by far the largest of the 
countries involved in this study, holding over one-third of the total population. What 
happens to Russia weighs very heavily when it comes to any judgment about whether the 
transition to capitalism was positive or negative overall. 
 The remaining fourteen countries have surpassed their stagnation trajectories at 
various times. Transition provided some benefits for them in the end, at least compared to 
the alternative of attempting to remain on the course of the 1980s. But not all had the same 
experience. Some, such as Poland, recovered quickly from a relatively minor collapse in 
the 1990s and have undergone impressive economic growth since then. Others, like the 
Kyrgyz Republic, paid an extremely heavy price for their improved trajectory and would 
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have to maintain their current growth rates for decades before they can say that the benefits 
of transition outweigh the losses. 
 There are several different ways to measure “success” (or lack thereof) after the 
transition to capitalism. One approach is to compare the recent level of GDP per capita 
with the one suggested by the stagnation path, and see whether a given country is above, 
below, or very close to where it may have been if it had continued with Soviet-type 
socialism without reform. Such an approach, however, treats the present day as the “final 
result” of transition and does not take into account the full experience of the past quarter-
century or the costs of transition (which in some cases were staggering). Thus, another 
approach would be to measure the difference between the stagnation path and actual 
performance for all of the years since the Soviet model was abandoned, and look at the net 
gain or net loss over that period. 
 The following table provides a summary of results using both approaches. A "net 
gain per capita" is reported in the first column.3 This is the sum of the differences between 
actual GDP per capita and estimated GDP per capita on the stagnation path, for the years 
1989-2016. It can be interpreted as showing how much value was gained (or lost) per 
capita in a given country over those 27 years. The table is organized in descending order 
according to this number. The next column lists a "capitalism success index (2016)", which 
                                                             
3 Economic analysis often uses a discount rate to compare gains and losses at different times, but that 
would not be appropriate here. In this analysis, there is no uncertainty about the future that would make it 
necessary to discount it. Furthermore, with gains and losses spread out over the entire population of a 
country, including all age groups and other demographic categories, it is unclear how these gains and losses 
over time could be weighted. 
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is the ratio between the actual GDP per capita in 2016 and the estimated GDP per capita for 
that year on the stagnation trajectory. This shows a snapshot of the situation in each 
country as of 2016. The "Recovery Year" is the year that a country has surpassed its 1985 
level of GDP per capita.  The "Crossover Year" is the first year after 1990 when a country 
has surpassed its stagnation trajectory. Normally, the Recovery Year occurs before the 
Crossover Year. But that order is reversed in the case of some countries with downward-
sloping stagnation trajectories, and in the case of countries with nearly flat stagnation 
trajectories the years may be the same. 
 
Table 1: Analysis by country 
Country 






Recovery Year Crossover Year 
Poland 153,174 2.353 1996 1996 
Albania 54,089 2.062 1996 1999 
Armenia 31,235 2.202 2003 2002 
Estonia 13,388 1.198 1997 2003 
Kazakhstan 11,734 1.528 2003 2005 
Uzbekistan 9,783 2.058 2007 2005 










Recovery Year Crossover Year 
Romania -5,797 1.452 2006 2005 
Belarus -10,326 1.126 2002 2006 
Czech Republic -10,445 1.055 1995 2005 
Latvia -17,129 1.328 2003 2005 
Kyrgyz Republic -20,386 1.082 2015 2013 
Turkmenistan -28,105 1.868 2008 2009 
Slovakia -32,755 1.064 1995 2006 
Tajikistan -65,286 0.674 N/A N/A 
Moldova -88,712 0.659 N/A N/A 
Hungary -89,158 0.925 2000 N/A 
Russia -144,783 0.919 2006 N/A 
Lithuania -151,721 0.971 2003 N/A 
Ukraine -196,920 0.411 N/A N/A 
Azerbaijan -245,006 0.629 2006 N/A 
Georgia -356,052 0.253 N/A N/A 
 
As can be seen from the table, the net “gain” is overwhelmingly negative. That is to 
say, over the quarter-century since the beginning of transition to capitalism, the average 
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citizen of most countries on the list has lost more than he has gained. It is not easy to 
dismiss this as mere growing pains that will be offset by future benefits from higher growth 
under capitalism. Twenty-seven years have already passed, and even with optimistic 
growth estimates, it will take most countries another decade or more simply to break even. 
Furthermore, several countries on the list, including large ones such as Russia and Ukraine, 
show no signs of being on a consistent trajectory with radically higher growth rates than the 
stagnation path, and therefore may not break even at all in the foreseeable future. Ukraine 
in particular (the second largest country on the list) is still far below its 1985 level of GDP 
per capita, and has very slim prospects of even recovering pre-transition living standards, 
let alone surpassing the stagnation path. Russia suffered a lost decade and a half, never 
exceeded the growth path that could have been expected from continued stagnation, and its 
growth rates are currently declining. 
3.4  Transition versus stagnation in the aggregate 
The country-by-country analysis provides useful information, but it distorts the 
general picture of the outcome of capitalist transition because of the different sizes of the 
countries involved. As of 2016, the total combined population of all 22 countries in this 
study was 386.008 million. Of those, 142.36 million (36.9%) lived in Russia, 44.21 million 
(11.5%) lived in Ukraine, and 38.53 million (10%) lived in Poland. At the other end of the 
scale, seven countries had a population under five million each. So the great majority of the 
population is located in a few states, and a general comparison of the transition to 
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capitalism versus continued stagnation under Soviet-type socialism has to take this into 
account. 
For that purpose, we have aggregated the data from all 22 countries, weighted by 
population. Because some countries experienced population growth while others 
experienced population decline over the years involved, the weights are dynamic. For every 
year, each country is given a weight corresponding to its population in that year. In passing, 
it is interesting to note that the total combined population of the 22 countries has not 
changed much over the period under consideration. In 1985 it was 375.56 million, in 1990 
it was 387.44 million, and in 2016 it was 386 million. Individual countries, however, show 
considerable variation. 
The following table shows the aggregate GDP per capita for the region represented 
by the 22 countries, both as it was historically during the years from 1989 to 2016, and as it 
would have been on the projected stagnation path of the Soviet model. The difference 








Table 2: Analysis in the aggregate 
Year 




capita GDP on the 
stagnation path 
Net gain from 
transition 
1989 15,714 15,829 -115 
1990 15,010 15,942 -932 
1991 13,891 16,058 -2166 
1992 12,237 16,178 -3941 
1993 11,382 16,306 -4924 
1994 10,330 16,439 -6109 
1995 10,138 16,573 -6436 
1996 10,023 16,701 -6678 
1997 10,201 16,831 -6630 
1998 10,058 16,964 -6906 
1999 10,495 17,095 -6600 
2000 11,291 17,226 -5935 
2001 11,882 17,357 -5476 
2002 12,457 17,489 -5032 
2003 13,304 17,623 -4319 
2004 14,294 17,760 -3466 








capita GDP on the 
stagnation path 
Net gain from 
transition 
2006 16,445 18,042 -1596 
2007 17,786 18,193 -407 
2008 18,641 18,351 291 
2009 17,556 18,512 -956 
2010 18,226 18,674 -448 
2011 18,982 18,838 144 
2012 19,449 19,004 446 
2013 19,795 19,172 623 
2014 20,059 19,345 714 
2015 19,870 19,521 350 
2016 19,986 19,697 289 



















There are two striking facts about this result. First, the size of the total net loss from 
transition is enormous. Summing up the gains and losses for all the years between 1989 and 
2016, the total loss comes out to be $78,920 per capita (in 2015 USD). Divided over the 28 
years in question, this amounts to a loss of $2,819 per year, per person, on average. The 
initial per capita GDP of the region was $15,711 in 1988. So the average citizen of the ex-
Soviet and ex-Warsaw Pact countries lost approximately 18% of his annual income due to 
the transition to capitalism. 
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Second, there appears to be very little prospect that capitalism might generate the 
sustained high rates of economic growth that would be necessary to recover this loss in the 
foreseeable future. There was a decade of high growth from 1998 to 2008, which saw GDP 
per capita recover from the depths of the depression up to approximately the same level 
predicted by the stagnation path. That is to say, it returned to where it might have been if 
Soviet-type socialism had continued without reform. After 2008 there was a brief drop 
caused by the global effects of the Great Recession, and then there was a return to growth, 
but not at the pre-2008 rates. The new, lower growth rate has resulted in a performance that 
tracks the socialist stagnation path quite closely. It seems that, in the end, the economic 
effect of capitalist transition has been to simply return the region to the long-run path that it 
was already on in the 1980s, but at tremendous cost.  
3.5  Other economic effects of transition 
Up to this point, we have focused on a single economic indicator: GDP per capita. 
That is because it is an indicator commonly used as a proxy for living standards, and 
because much better data exists for GDP in the Soviet-type economies than for almost any 
other kind of economic indicator. Furthermore, the stagnation of the 1980s in the Soviet-
type economies was primarily a stagnation in terms of GDP growth, and the main promise 
of capitalism was that it could provide higher GDP growth rates (and thus higher living 
standards). For all these reasons, our main comparison between capitalism and Soviet-type 
socialism was done in GDP terms. 
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However, there are many other indicators that are relevant for welfare comparisons. 
The available data does not allow us to perform the same analysis with them as we carried 
out with per capita GDP, but we can at least observe how they changed as a result of the 
transition from Soviet-type socialism to capitalism. In what follows, we will present data 
on the Gini coefficient and on unemployment. 
3.5.1  Inequality  
There are several different sources that estimate the Gini coefficients for income in 
most of the world’s economies, but they rarely provide data on the USSR or Eastern 
Europe during the period of Soviet-type socialism. Fortunately, the “All the Ginis” dataset, 
created by Branko Milanovic for the World Bank’s Development Research Group, does 
provide Gini values for those countries, at least near the end of the socialist period (late 
1980s). (Milanovic 2014) The data does not cover every year for every country, and for a 
number of countries in the region there is no data at all, but we can still form a general 
picture by comparing the available Gini coefficients from the late 1980s to those from the 
1990s and 2000s. The following tables show those available Gini coefficients, between the 
years 1987 and 2007, based on the “All Ginis” dataset from 2013. The dataset draws from 
several sources and reports a “combined Gini coefficient” based on them. That is the 
variable shown in these tables. Of the 22 countries in our study, four (Albania, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Tajikistan) have no Gini data at all for the socialist period. As such, they have 






Table 3: Gini coefficients (East-Central Europe) 
 Bulgaria Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia 
1987 20.8  21 24.3   
1988 22 19.0  24.1  19.3 
1989 21.7 19.4 24.8 25.2 21.8 18.1 
1990 22.6 19.7  24.8 22.9 17.8 
1991 23.8 22.4 28.7 24.7 27.1 18 
1992 30 21.0 27.8 25 25.5 20.2 
1993 33.3 25.9 22.5 26.3  17.8 
1994 34.2 22.1 33.2 27.1 32.1 20.8 
1995 32.3 21.5 31.5 26.9 31.1 20 
1996 36 26.1 31.1 27.2  25.9 
1997 36.1 27.6 31.9 28.3 30.4 23.4 
1998 34  29.6 32.7 26.9  
1999 33  30.3 32.3 29.4  
2000 33.1 28.1 31.6 34.7 31.3  
2001 33.6  31.2 36 39.5  
2002 35.1 27.0 26.8 33.4 32  
2003 27.2  31.1 34.9 31.5  
2004  27.5 30 35.8 37.5 29.1 
2005 29.4 27.5 31 37.9 29.7 27.2 
2006  26.9 34.7 35.8 32.1 29.6 











Table 4: Gini coefficients (ex-USSR, part 1) 
 Russia Belarus Ukraine Moldova Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
1988 20.8 20.1 20.1 20 19.9 19.7 19.8 
1989        
1990 25.9 23.3 21.4 26.7 24 24 24.8 
1991   18.9     
1992 43.4  25.7 34.3 41.2 23.5 30.2 
1993 36 20.2  37.2 38.3 24.8 30.8 
1994 39.7  42.8  39.6  36.8 
1995 45.2 28.6 42.8  37.4 32  
1996 37 26.6 35.1  32.6 32.6 35.7 
1997 38.8 28.2 31.4 42.1 33.5 32.6 33.1 
1998 37.4 31.1  40.2 34.5 32.1 33.3 
1999 36.7 29.7 30 39 34.9 33.1 33.2 
2000 44.7 32.2 33.3 38.1 36.2 35.8 33 
2001 39.7 29.8 32.7 37.4 37.9  32.4 
2002 39.7 27.8 27.8 37.2 39.2 35.4 29.1 
2003 40.3  25.8 34.9 36.3 36.4 35.3 
2004 40.9 26.6 27.6 35 34.2 35 35.1 
2005 40.9 28 27.4 36.3 34 36.4 36.9 
2006 41.6 28.7 29.1 36.1 33.7 38.9 35.2 








Table 5: Gini coefficients (ex-USSR, part 2) 
 Armenia Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Rep. Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
1988 26.9 21.3 18.6 18.8 24.2 
1989 39.4     
1990 26.9 23.6 22.6 30.8 31.5 
1991   18.9   
1992   40.6 24.1  
1993  31.9 42.8 35.1 33.1 
1994 60.6     
1995 62.1     
1996 45.7 35.2    
1997 43.1     
1998 39  35.8 42.1 45.0 
1999 35     
2000   31.4  28.0 
2001 30.4 32.3 35.0   
2002 29.6 37.7 28.7 42.7 32.0 
2003 26.2 29.5 28.7 41.1 35.2 
2004 25.7 32.3 34.8 41.4  
2005 29.6 27.3 27.9 39.2  
2006 32.8 30.8 38.7   
2007 30.2 30.9 33.4   
 
In spite of the incomplete data, a clear pattern emerges. The transition to capitalism 
was accompanied by a substantial rise of income inequality in every single country for 
which data exists. In some cases the shift was dramatic, as in Russia, where the Gini 
coefficient grew from 20.8 to 43.4 within four years, and then remained in the range of 36 
to 45 for the following decade and a half. Among the other large countries, Poland saw a 
rise from 24.3 to 34.6, and Ukraine saw a smaller increase from 20.1 to 29.6. 
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This rise in income inequality means that the costs of transition were not evenly 
distributed. Lower-income groups were disproportionately affected, and suffered losses 
greater than the per capita figures calculated in sections 2 and 3. Furthermore, the transition 
to capitalism caused a permanent shift to higher levels of inequality, not a temporary spike. 
This means that even in those countries where the per capita costs of transition were later 
recovered through higher economic growth, the net effect on people with lower incomes 
may still be negative. And the already bleak prospects for the region as a whole to benefit 
from the transition to capitalism are even bleaker when we focus on the most vulnerable 
populations in the region. The transition to capitalism has hurt the average citizen of the 
region composed of East-Central Europe and the former USSR, but lower income citizens 
were hurt even more than average. To the extent that the working class is composed of 
people with lower incomes, we can say that the costs of capitalism were particularly high 
for the working class. 
3.5.2  Unemployment 
Soviet-type socialism aimed to guarantee a job to every worker. Advocates of the 
system stated that the elimination of unemployment was one of its most important goals. 
The Soviet Union and the socialist countries following its model officially held that this 
goal had been achieved, and that unemployment did not exist in their economies. For this 
reason, they did not collect unemployment data. Western analysts, however, argued that 
there were people in the Soviet-type economies who were, at certain times, willing and able 
to work, not employed, and actively looking for a job – in other words, people who would 
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be officially classified as “unemployed” in a capitalist economy. So the Soviet-type 
economies could be said to have an “unemployment rate”, at least for the purpose of 
comparison with capitalism. This rate is difficult to estimate, but it was in any case very 
low. 
The 1988 study Unemployment in the Soviet Union: Evidence from the Soviet 
Interview Project, by Paul Gregory and Irwin Collier, estimated the unemployment rate in 
the USSR in the late 1970s based on interviews conducted with Soviet citizens who had 
emigrated to the United States. The interviewees were asked questions related to their 
employment history during the last five years of normal life in the USSR before the 
emigration decision. There are a number of important findings in the study, but for our 
purposes the key finding is that the estimated unemployment rate in the USSR in the late 
1970s was 1.1 percent. (Gregory and Collier 1988: 617) This methodology is not perfect, 
but it confirms that the economy of the USSR tended to generate very little unemployment, 
and we can reasonably expect that the Soviet-type economies of East-Central Europe were 
not radically different from the USSR in this regard. 
Starting with 1991, we have unemployment data provided by the International 
Labour Organization (2018). This enables us to observe the effects of the transition to 
capitalism. The data for the twenty-year period from 1991 to 2011 is shown in the tables 





Table 6: Unemployment rates under capitalism (East-Central Europe) 
 Albania Bulgaria Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia 
1991 22.32 21.24 2.27 9.60 12.53 8.07 12.20 
1992 22.65 21.49 3.30 9.94 13.32 8.26 12.60 
1993 24.83 21.39 4.32 12.10 14.00 8.24 12.20 
1994 24.58 20.17 4.30 10.85 14.44 8.17 13.65 
1995 23.86 15.91 4.02 10.17 13.34 8.01 13.11 
1996 23.40 13.75 3.89 10.02 12.35 6.74 11.34 
1997 23.19 13.70 4.27 8.99 10.96 5.51 11.89 
1998 23.03 12.20 5.90 8.93 9.94 5.63 12.19 
1999 23.29 14.10 8.49 6.93 12.29 6.24 15.95 
2000 22.73 16.22 8.76 6.56 16.31 6.97 19.06 
2001 22.68 19.92 7.99 5.67 18.37 6.56 19.38 
2002 21.49 18.11 7.02 5.61 19.89 8.11 18.72 
2003 20.15 13.73 7.54 5.79 19.37 6.95 17.12 
2004 18.82 12.04 8.21 5.83 19.07 7.72 18.60 
2005 17.46 10.08 7.93 7.19 17.75 7.17 16.26 
2006 16.04 8.95 7.15 7.49 13.84 7.27 13.37 
2007 13.50 6.88 5.32 7.41 9.60 6.41 11.14 
2008 13.05 5.61 4.39 7.82 7.12 5.79 9.51 
2009 13.76 6.82 6.66 10.03 8.17 6.86 12.03 
2010 14.20 10.28 7.28 11.17 9.64 6.96 14.38 
2011 13.98 11.26 6.71 11.03 9.63 7.18 13.62 
 
Table 7: Unemployment rates under capitalism (ex-USSR, part 1) 
 Russia Ukraine Moldova Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
1991 5.69 5.76 8.47 1.47 18.89 17.79 
1992 5.31 5.49 8.18 3.68 18.11 17.05 
1993 5.91 5.18 8.27 6.54 19.13 17.39 
1994 8.08 5.25 7.39 7.56 21.66 17.33 
1995 9.66 5.62 8.45 9.66 20.12 17.54 
1996 9.86 7.65 10.86 9.92 20.93 16.40 
1997 11.81 8.93 10.94 10.37 14.90 14.13 
1998 13.39 11.32 11.02 9.51 14.46 13.71 
1999 13.53 11.59 11.13 11.57 13.79 13.39 
2000 10.58 11.63 8.47 13.36 14.21 15.93 
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 Russia Ukraine Moldova Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
2001 8.98 10.95 7.28 13.13 13.82 16.84 
2002 7.92 9.63 6.80 10.03 13.83 13.01 
2003 8.23 9.06 7.95 11.29 12.06 12.87 
2004 7.78 8.59 8.17 10.25 11.71 10.68 
2005 7.17 7.18 7.29 8.03 10.03 8.32 
2006 7.16 6.81 7.38 5.91 7.03 5.78 
2007 6.10 6.35 5.07 4.59 6.05 4.25 
2008 6.32 6.36 3.98 5.45 7.74 5.83 
2009 8.42 8.84 6.40 13.55 17.51 13.79 
2010 7.37 8.10 7.45 16.71 19.48 17.81 
2011 6.54 7.86 6.68 12.33 16.21 15.39 
 
Table 8: Unemployment rates under capitalism (ex-USSR, part 2) 
 Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Kazakhstan 
1991 1.98 9.13 10.09 1.14 
1992 1.80 7.78 9.40 1.13 
1993 5.30 7.79 9.51 1.11 
1994 6.60 8.40 10.14 7.54 
1995 6.70 8.39 12.05 10.98 
1996 9.30 11.54 14.43 12.96 
1997 10.80 12.07 14.74 13.00 
1998 9.40 11.93 14.55 13.10 
1999 11.20 12.28 13.80 13.46 
2000 11.94 11.80 10.82 12.75 
2001 12.74 10.90 11.16 10.43 
2002 13.73 10.00 12.59 9.33 
2003 14.53 9.25 11.51 8.78 
2004 15.32 8.00 12.62 8.40 
2005 16.07 7.30 13.81 8.13 
2006 16.83 6.62 13.58 7.79 
2007 17.52 6.54 13.28 7.26 
2008 17.99 6.05 16.47 6.63 
2009 18.74 5.74 16.84 6.55 
2010 19.01 5.63 16.30 5.77 




Table 9: Unemployment rates under capitalism (ex-USSR, part 3) 
 Kyrgyz Rep. Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
1991 5.49 7.63 2.81 6.55 
1992 5.10 6.60 2.47 6.31 
1993 5.14 6.86 2.50 6.48 
1994 5.25 7.20 2.62 6.41 
1995 5.51 7.53 2.75 6.52 
1996 7.24 11.28 4.04 8.32 
1997 7.40 11.53 4.24 8.27 
1998 7.47 11.22 3.98 8.27 
1999 7.61 11.67 3.98 8.27 
2000 7.50 11.31 3.89 8.28 
2001 7.80 11.07 3.82 8.27 
2002 12.55 11.46 3.94 8.28 
2003 9.92 11.41 3.91 8.29 
2004 8.53 11.37 3.92 8.25 
2005 8.11 11.19 3.81 8.26 
2006 8.27 11.12 3.81 8.26 
2007 8.15 11.21 3.83 8.23 
2008 8.22 11.13 3.75 8.23 
2009 8.41 11.50 3.94 8.22 
2010 8.64 11.72 4.00 8.19 
2011 8.53 11.16 3.75 8.16 
 
 Naturally, different countries have different experiences, ranging from the 
consistently low unemployment in Turkmenistan to over a decade of double-digit 
unemployment in Albania or Tajikistan. It is clear, however, that all countries involved – 
perhaps with the exception of Turkmenistan – experienced significantly higher 
unemployment under capitalism than would be expected under Soviet-type socialism (i.e. 
very low single digits). It is also clear that this was a long-term shift and not a temporary 
effect of the transition. Moving from a centrally planned, Soviet-type economy to a 
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capitalist economy leads to consistently higher unemployment rates, just as it leads to 
consistently higher inequality. 
 The consequences of the transition to capitalism in terms of inequality and 
unemployment are precisely as expected. In fact, socialism is often criticized precisely for 
“artificially” suppressing income differentials and keeping unemployment low through job 
guarantees, both of which are traditionally considered to be policies that reduce efficiency 
and inhibit economic growth. So a shift to higher inequality and higher unemployment was 
always expected as one of the costs of greater efficiency and higher growth under 
capitalism. But, as we have seen, those benefits of capitalism have largely failed to 
materialize across the region. The former socialist economies paid the expected price in 
terms of inequality and unemployment, but did not reap the expected benefit in terms of 
higher living standards. 
3.6  Conclusion 
 Soviet-type socialism (STS) faced a period of stagnation in its final decade, with a 
lackluster economic performance. It was replaced by capitalism under the belief that 
capitalism would deliver higher growth rates and better living standards. A few countries 
did indeed achieve far greater economic growth under capitalism than they could have 
reasonably expected to achieve under STS. But in the majority of cases the introduction of 
capitalism brought no net benefit, even a quarter-century later, and even when compared 
with a pessimistic “stagnation path” that assumes no improvement in the performance of 
STS after the 1980s. In some cases, including large countries such as Ukraine, the 
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introduction of capitalism was followed by economic ruin and even a shift to a lower long-
run growth trajectory than the “stagnation path”. Russia, the largest of the states that have 
undergone the transition to capitalism, took over a decade and a half to return to pre-
transition levels of income, and never exceeded the growth path that could have been 
expected from continued stagnation.  
 When aggregating the data for the entire region, we see that there was an 
enormously costly transition, with incomes only returning to the levels predicted by the 
“stagnation path” 20 years after the introduction of capitalism, and after that point 
capitalism produced a growth trend very similar to the STS stagnation path. Thus, by the 
performance measures used here, in the region as a whole capitalism has not outperformed 
socialism. On the contrary, the transition to capitalism appears to have only returned the 
region to the same long-run trajectory it was following before, at the cost of two lost 
decades. However, because there are significant differences between individual countries, 
the transition did deliver net benefits in some cases, with the countries of East-Central 
Europe generally performing much better than the former Soviet republics under 
capitalism. 
 The transition to capitalism also brought a long-term increase in unemployment, 
and a shift to higher levels of income inequality. As a result, the costs of transition were 
particularly severe for lower income groups and the working class. 
Advocates of capitalism may insist that if success was possible for some of the new 
capitalist states, such as Poland, then it was possible for all, and the failures are to be 
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blamed on bad policy rather than any inherent shortcomings of capitalism itself. This may 
be true. But the same counterfactual argument could be made about STS. A few of the 
socialist economies, such as Czechoslovakia, were still doing well in the 1980s. Perhaps 
there existed some policies that could have been adopted by all Soviet-type economies that 
would have enabled them to return to higher growth without systemic change. However, it 
is unreasonable to expect an economic system to be judged only by its successes and best-
case scenarios. It may be true that best-case capitalism is superior to actually existing STS. 
But capitalism and STS alike should be evaluated based on their typical, average results in 
the countries that have tried both of them. "Real socialism" must be compared with "real 
capitalism" in the same region - not with the best case scenario of capitalism. 
 And such a comparison, at least when it is based on the ability of the two systems to 
raise living standards as measured by GDP per capita, does not indicate any clear winner. 
What this means for "real socialism" is that while it has not succeeded, neither has it failed 
when compared to the alternative. Contrary to the claims of liberal capitalists, many of the 
Soviet-type economies were in fact better able to raise living standards than the systems 
based on markets and private property that replaced them. STS did bring rapid growth for a 
time in some places. But contrary to the claims of the original Marxist founders of STS, 
that system did not usher in a new age of abundance. So it did not succeed in meeting the 
standards that socialists had claimed for it. STS did not provide confirmation for the 




 It is entirely reasonable to argue, however, that socialism – even the Soviet model 
of socialism at its lowest performance levels – is able to provide the same average level of 
prosperity as capitalism. This has been the experience of many countries that have tried 
both systems, and the overall experience in the region composed of the former USSR and 
East-Central Europe. So, where does this leave the case for a socialist planned economy in 
the future? On the one hand, the concerns that a socialist planned economy would be 
inevitably less efficient than capitalism are probably unfounded. Based on historical 
precedent, we have reason to believe that a planned economy can achieve results similar to 
a capitalist one under similar conditions. But on the other hand, the argument that a planned 
economy could be significantly more efficient than a capitalist one appears unfounded as 
well. Therefore, it does not seem tenable to advocate socialism based on concerns about 
economic growth or the development of the forces of production. A case for a socialist 
planned economy can certainly be made, but it would have to be based on concerns about 
justice, equality, distribution of resources, and long-term sustainability. The primary 
advantage of socialism in a developed economy is not that it can greatly surpass the speed 
of capitalist economic growth – as its advocates once argued, and as was the case during 
the initial industrialization period – but rather that it can potentially create a society that, 
without sacrificing economic growth, will bring other advantages such as a more 






In the 21st century, the past of socialism is contentious and the future of socialism 
is unclear. These two aspects are closely connected. One of the main reasons why the 
future is unclear is precisely because no consensus has been reached about the past. There 
is a prevailing sense that something went wrong in the 20th century – after all, most of the 
socialist experiments of that century no longer exist – but there is little agreement as to 
what went wrong and what lessons we are to draw from it. 
One widespread view is that 20th century socialism made a grave error when trying 
to replace the market economy with a planned economy. According to this view, economic 
planning is inherently inferior to market mechanisms, and a socialist planned economy will 
inevitably produce lower living standards than a market economy under similar 
circumstances. The examples of the two Germanies and the two Koreas are often used to 
illustrate this point. 
If this line of thinking were correct, we should expect to see consistently better 
performances in terms of economic growth and improving living standards after countries 
transition from a planned economy to a market economy. There are, of course, local factors 
influencing the performance of each country, including institutions, the level of corruption, 
and others. Nevertheless, if planning were categorically inferior to markets, transition to a 
market economy should generally put countries on a superior growth path (with some 
exceptions, naturally). Yet this is not the pattern that emerges from the data. As we have 
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seen, while some countries performed better after transition and others performed worse, 
the general trend was to return to the pre-transition growth path (after paying very high 
social and economic costs). So, in general, the transition to a market economy did not lead 
to better economic performance in terms of per capita GDP growth. 
That is only true in the aggregate, and there are individual success stories that do 
not follow the general pattern. Poland performed exceptionally well after its transition to a 
market economy, for instance. But, even leaving aside the question of whether the Polish 
experience could have been replicated elsewhere, individual success stories do not prove a 
general superiority of market economies over planned economies (and likewise, individual 
cases where planning performed much better than markets, as in Ukraine, do not prove the 
opposite). In general, the performance of planned economies and market economies in 
East-Central Europe and the ex-USSR is similar enough that we cannot say which system 
is superior based on historical experience alone. 
This is an argument against the dismissal of socialist economic planning that has 
become a part of conventional wisdom after the end of the Cold War. Economic planning is 
not inherently inferior to market mechanisms, and a socialist planned economy will not 
necessarily produce lower living standards than a market economy under similar 
circumstances. 
However, if market economies and planned economies can achieve similar 
economic growth, that is not by itself a strong argument for future models of socialism to 
be based on economic planning. After all, several different models of market socialism 
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have also been proposed, and their proponents claim that these models can achieve the 
main goals of socialism – goals revolving around economic equality, social justice, an 
equitable distribution of resources and environmental sustainability – in the context of a 
market economy. Why should socialists prefer planning instead of markets, if both are 
viable options? 
One reason to prefer planning is because a planned economy can achieve one goal 
of socialism that market-based systems cannot achieve: the abolition of exploitation. 
Market socialism, like all market economies, would require some type of atomized 
ownership of the means of production. That is to say, different workplaces would have to 
be owned or controlled by different economic agents, with opposing interests, engaged in 
profit-seeking behavior. The economic agents in question would not be individual 
capitalists, and workplaces would not legally allow capitalist wage labor contracts to exist. 
Nevertheless, capitalist relations of production would re-emerge in practice, if not between 
individuals then between collective economic agents (for example, between one co-op and 
other co-ops). As long as ownership of the means of production is atomized – as long as 
different economic agents have separate control over different means of production – some 
agents will control more valuable productive property than others, and they will able to use 
this to exploit those others (especially if the others control no means of production at all, 
for example a co-op that must rent its workplace and machinery). Even if individuals 
cannot exploit other individuals, there will be groups that can exploit other groups. 
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In order for a society to be free of exploitation, it cannot allow ownership or control 
of the means of production by independent profit-seeking agents. This means that it cannot 
have a market economy. Therefore, to the extent that the abolition of exploitation is a 
significant goal of socialism, future models of socialism ought to be based on economic 
planning. 
Any such future model of socialist economic planning should also draw lessons 
from the 20th century and expect to face some of the same dilemmas that confronted 
socialist planned economies in the past. One of these dilemmas, the tradeoff between 
innovation and job security, is likely to appear in every planned economy regardless of the 
level of democracy accompanying it. This is not a fatal flaw, but it is a source of potential 
problems. 
The tradeoff arises from the fact that technological progress inevitably renders 
certain jobs obsolete. In fact, entire workplaces and sometimes even entire industries have 
to be closed down as better technology becomes available. This will disrupt the lives of the 
workers performing the jobs that are no longer needed. Even if unemployment does not 
exist (in other words, even if those workers are immediately offered new jobs elsewhere), 
the loss of their old employment is likely to impact them negatively. Therefore, in a 
planned economy, there may be popular pressure pushing in a technologically conservative 
direction. And this, in turn, can result in a slower rate of technological progress, which 
would put socialism at a disadvantage compared to rival capitalist societies. 
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There are many possible ways to respond to this potential problem. One option is to 
do nothing at all, and accept that if the population democratically decides to forgo certain 
innovations for the sake of preserving certain jobs, that is simply the correct course of 
action. The fact that economic planning allows a democratic decision to be made on this 
matter may even be regarded as one of the advantages of socialism. Capitalism does not 
allow anyone to choose between pursuing innovation and preserving existing jobs. The 
logic of the system compels capitalist firms to take the side of pursuing innovation every 
time. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that choosing to preserve certain jobs at the cost of 
not implementing certain innovations would make socialism lag behind capitalism in 
technological development. This may not be a problem if there are no advanced capitalist 
societies acting as rivals to the socialist society, but we cannot rely on random chance to 
provide favorable international circumstances. 
If the international circumstances are not favorable and advanced capitalist rivals 
exist, the socialist society will need to find ways of promoting technological innovation in 
spite of its negative impact on job stability. Options for doing this include: Providing 
generous compensation packages to workers who have to switch jobs such that they do not 
regard the loss of their old job as a net negative, keeping job stability as the general rule but 
allowing for exceptions in specific industries, and importing particularly desirable new 
products while only gradually introducing domestic production of them. 
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It is not possible to guess in advance all the challenges that may be faced by future 
socialist societies, nor is it possible to know what model they might choose to pursue and 
how it will differ from 20th century socialist experiments. However, a careful look at the 
socialism of the past can help inform the socialism of the future. A planned economy 
remains viable and desirable if we wish to overcome exploitation, but may face 
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